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The history of using economic sanctions to curb nuclear proliferation has had mixed results. The 
goal of this research project is to determine why economic sanctions are more effective in some 
cases than they are in others. The two case studies, North Korea and Iran, are examples of the 
failures and successes of economic sanctions, respectively. In order to understand it is the 
disparity in outcomes of economic sanctions a framework of four factors was designed. This 
framework consists of: limited political contestation within the sanctioned country, economic 
versus security vulnerability, and the international cooperation mounted against the target state. 
In Iran’s case, the limited contestation under an authoritarian regime, the desperate need to get 
oil and gas exports on the international market, relatively low security concerns, and a 
coordinated international campaign of economic sanctions explain why the sanctions have thus 
far prevented Iran from developing nuclear weapons. In North Korea’s case, the absolute nature 
of its authoritarianism, the insular command economy, high security concerns, and countries like 
China and South Korea shielding North Korea from economic sanctions are the reasons why 
economic sanctions have fallen short in stopping North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
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Nuclear proliferation is a security concern that affects the international community. A 
myriad of methods have been developed over the years to stop the spread of these weapons of 
mass destruction, but one of the most notable methods are economic sanctions. Economic 
sanctions are “barriers or restrictions imposed on one state or international actor by another state 
or group of states for the purpose of obtaining political or economic concessions.” 1 The use of 
economic sanctions, not just in curbing nuclear proliferation, has been on the rise since the end 
of the Cold War. The effectiveness for economic sanctions in stopping nuclear proliferation has 
been mixed. The central goal of this research project is to explore why economic sanctions are 
effective at stopping certain states' nuclear programs and ineffective at stopping others. 
 
In order to achieve this goal this research project will be taking a comparative approach 
using the most similar system model. The two states to be examined are Iran and North Korea. 
While no two states are the same there are enough similarities between the two countries to 
warrant an analysis. Some common features include economic sanctions on their respective 
nuclear program, their antagonistic attitude towards the United States, the authoritarian regimes 
in these countries, and the strive of both states to survive in an anarchical international system. 
Iran is an example of a successful use of economic sanctions and North Korea will be an 





1 Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, 353  




and Iran, but it is in their differences that will provide the most insight. I argue that four variables 
have been crucial in determining the effectiveness of economic sanctions: economic 
vulnerability, security vulnerability, the unity of the international community in the enforcement 
of these economic sanctions, and the levels of political contestation in the targeted country. The 
sanctions against Iran have been relatively successful because the limited political contestation in 
that country despite its authoritarian regime, Iran’s high economic vulnerability and low security 
concerns, and the largely unified nature of the international community regarding the sanctions. 
In contrast, the conditions have been the opposite in North Korea, which have made economic 





























Chapter 1: Theoretical framework 
 
For the purposes of this research project Neorealism will be used to better understand the 
interactions between states within the international community. While this theory will be useful 
in some respects the theory leaves a lot to be desired with regards to domestic issues. Neorealism 
lacks focus on domestic issues such as declining economic prosperity and its effect on 
government policy as well as the inner workings of governments. Both of those factors are 
important in explaining the effectiveness of economic sanctions and are not adequately explored 
within the neorealist framework. To better explain the impact, or lack thereof, of economic 
sanctions on Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear programs this project will be examining the 
respective state’s domestic concerns. This is a departure from traditional neorealism, but without 
the domestic analysis this research project would be inadequate in explaining the differences in 
the phenomenon. While neorealism is a useful theory for the purposes of this research project its 
limitations must be acknowledged.  
 
 
Neorealism, a continuation of classical realism, is an approach to international relations 
that hypothesize “the structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to 
pursue power.” 2 To a neorealist, the international system is inherently anarchical. That is to say 
“there is no centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states” 3 in the international 





2 Ibid, 78 
3 Ibid, 79  




they operate in an anarchic system.” 4 No state is immune to “the condition of anarchy, insecurity 
does not discriminate against ‘bad’ states, as though moral failures are sufficient to make their 
security concerns invalid.” 5  
 
From the understanding that the international system is inherently anarchistic John J 
Mearsheimer articulates three assumptions can be made about the nature of states. The first of 
these assumptions is that “the main goal of states is survival.” 6 In an anarchical system states 
often compete against one another for limited resources and greater influence in the international 
system. Due to the harsh nature of the international system states are largely responsible for their 
own survival. The next assumption that “states are rational actors, which is to say they are 
capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for survival.” 7 The 
actions of a state are believed to be in that state's best interest (e.g. pursuing a nuclear program in 
the face of international pressure). The last assumption is that states “can never be certain about 
the intentions of other states.” 8 Due to the antagonistic nature of the international system, and 
the competition of limited resources and influence, states are often pitted against one another. 
States ought to be wary of deception to avoid being taken advantage of. 
 
Survival, the main goal of every states, is achieved through acquiring power. Power is 














she would not otherwise do.” 9 For the purposes of this paper this definition will be applied to 
states. How powerful a state is is “based on the material capabilities that a state controls.” 10 
Material capabilities are tangible objects usually associated with military might. Tanks, 
submarines, and nuclear weapons all fall into the category of material capabilities. If States A were 
to possess more tanks relative to State B then to a neorealist State A would be considered more 
powerful. Power is not purely relegated to a state’s military power.  
 
Neorealists acknowledge the importance of a state’s economic capabilities when factoring 
in the power a state possess. A strong economy is important for states, because economic growth 
allows governments “to devote greater resources to national defence [expenditures]” 11 and 
therefore become more secure in the process. Economics are not only important for providing 
resources for a state’s military capabilities but can be used in the “pursuit of wider strategic goals.” 
12 One form economic power takes shape is through economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are 
either positive, meaning states offer “actual or promised rewards” to make the targeted state change 
its policy goals, or negative which typically refers to “actual or threatened punishments.” 13 
Economic instruments can be useful even if there is little economic interaction between the two 
states because “of the signal they send about the intentions of the state imposing the sanctions.” 14 





9 Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1985, 20  
10 Dunne, Tim, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016, 78 
11 Mastanduno, Michael. “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship.” International Organization 52, 
no. 4 (1998): 825–54. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550761, 24  
12 Ibid  
13 Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Pr., 1985 
14 Ibid, 24 




However, the United States has tried to use extensive economic sanctions regime targeting North 
Korea over its nuclear program.  
 
While economics is often neglected when compared to military capabilities neorealists 
understand the importance of economics “in the realm of national security.” 15  The “weaponization 
of finance” 16 has made states use economic sanctions to coerce other states “when military means 
are ineffective because they are capable of producing greater global instability.” 17 For example, 
when Russia annexed Crimea in 2013 – 2014 strict economic sanctions were imposed on Russia 
instead of military action due to the potential of a greater conflict breaking out. Economic sanctions 
are often not the first policy option associated with neorealism, but prominent neorealists such as 
Stephen Walt acknowledge the “potential effectiveness of economic sanctions as a diplomatic 
instrument.” 18 
 
Following this framework, we make the following hypothesis about Iran and North Korea 
and their responses to economic sanctions. The first is that their responses are made rationally and 
are optimized to ensure the survival of the state. For Iran, pursuing a nuclear program at this time 
and under these circumstances is not in their best interest because economic sanctions do more 





15 Miller, Nicholas L. “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions.” International Organization 68, no. 4 
(2014): 913–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000216, 938 
16 Kat, Mazhid. “A Conceptual Analysis of Realism in International Political Economy.” E, April 18, 2015. 
https://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/a-conceptual-analysis-of-realism-in-international-political-economy/. 
17 Ibid  
18 Walt, Stephen M. “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 (1991): 211. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/2600471, 227  




opposite is true. In addition, there is a level of mistrust between North Korea and Iran with the 
larger international community. This mistrust partially explains the reluctance of both North Korea 
and Iran in fully cooperating with the international community. Once again, the lack of focus on 
domestic issues limits the scope of this theory. In order to have a better understanding of the 























Chapter 2: Understanding Economic Sanctions and their Application 
 
The focus of this thesis is to see why economic sanctions are effective in some cases and 
why they are not effective in others. To better explore this question, we must first understand 
economic sanctions, specifically, what economic sanctions are, how they are typically 
implemented, and when countries use economic sanctions rather than other policy tools such as 
military actions. The definition of economic sanctions for this project is a form of “economic 
pressure against other states for a variety of political purposes. There are two main categories of 
international economic weapons -trade restrictions and financial restrictions- each of which can be 
employed with varying intensity and scope. 19 This definition needs to be unpacked. Economic 
pressure refers to increased economic hardship such as contracting GDP or even a recession. 
Within the context of economic sanctions, the sending country will harm the targeted state’s 
economy in order to achieve political goals. To harm the targeted economy restrictions must be 
implemented. Trade restrictions restrict trade with the targeted state. These forms of sanctions can 
be potentially devastating to a state that relies heavy on exports. For example, Iran is highly 
dependent on exporting oil making the state a prime target from trade restrictions. Financial 
restrictions are more nuanced than trade restriction. Financial restrictions aim to restrict the target 
states access to international financial institutions, banks, and banking messaging systems like the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) system. These features 
are not exclusive to economic sanctions, as this definition could be applied to trade wars and 





19 Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22(2), 90-136. 
doi:10.1162/isec.22.2.90, 93 




be better off economically if they conceded to the coercer's demands, and made their decision 
based on whether they consider their political objectives to be worth the economic costs.” 20 Unlike 
trade wars, which try to gain economic concessions, and economic warfare, which tries to hinder 
the material capabilities of a target state, economic sanctions seek political concessions 21 from 
targeted country.  
Broad versus Targeted Sanctions  
 
Using this definition of economic sanctions, we can explore the different types of sanctions, 
and the positives and negatives to these different approaches. The two most common forms of 
economic sanctions are broad and smart. Broad sanctions, as the name suggests, are applied 
broadly to the target’s economy. These sanctions are designed to restrict the economic output of 
the target country in a way that affects the citizens at the bottom of society to the elites at the top 
and everyone in between. The logic behind this type of sanction is that restricting the material 
conditions of a population will create discontent among the population and will force the target 
government into concessions. 
 
Broad sanctions and their use have become a controversial policy option due to the various 
unintentional consequences. For starters, broad sanctions can backfire on the countries imposing 
the sanctions and can actually boost the popularity of the government in the target country. This 





20 Ibid, 95 
21 Ibid, 93 
22 Bergeijk, P. A. (2015). SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN – A PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT. 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). doi:https://www.jstor.or  g/stable/resrep07074.9, 53 




country is provided with a scapegoat for the country’s worsening economic condition. It is easier 
for the target country to shift the conversation from government mismanagement and general 
incompetence to a nationalistic rallying point to defend the country from hostile foreigners. While 
this effect is more effective in some countries than others it is nevertheless a problem with broad 
sanctions. 
 
Another concern with broad sanctions are the humanitarian costs they impose on the 
population of the target country. When broad sanctions are imposed, they “disproportionately hurt 
politically weak groups and benefited target regime sympathizers.” 23 While people in high 
positions within the targeted regime can acquire material goods through other means, such as 
smuggling, the same cannot be said for those without means and therefore are at the whims of the 
government. Women in targeted countries often suffer “disproportionately” 24 due to the fact 
women “are often the most powerless political actors in the target country.” 25 Abrupt restrictions 
of goods, such as food and medicine, can lead to humanitarian crises. For example, “in Iraq, [it is] 
estimated that the sanctions caused a minimum of 100,000 and up to 227,000 excess deaths among 










25 Ibid  
26 Ibid, 97 




Due to unfortunate consequences of broad sanctions on the mostly innocent population of 
the target country there have been developments in economic sanctions to more accurately target 
the regime while leaving the local population largely unaffected. This approach to economic 
sanctions is known as smart sanctions. Smart sanctions are sanctions designed to target “material 
incentives of powerful supporters ... these supporters will eventually pressure the targeted 
government into making concessions.” 27 Instead of targeting the average farmer or factory worker 
of the target country these smart sanctions target individuals who have close ties to the target 
regime. In addition, these sanctions restrict “corporations or holding companies associated with 
the target government's leadership.” 28 Instead of targeting necessities like the target country’s 
source of medicine and food smart sanctions tend to include “financial sanctions, asset freezes, 
travel bans, restrictions on luxury goods, and arms embargoes.” 29   
 
While smart sanctions are certainly more humane than broad sanctions, they have their 
own set of problems that make them ineffective. A major criticism of smart sanctions is that they 
can be applied too narrowly, and therefore “are less promising in coercing the target government 
into making concessions” 30 than broad sanctions. The logic follows that by targeting innocent 
bystanders within the target country this will cause discontent among the general population and 
therefore “will be more likely to produce target concession.” 31 While broad sanctions can trigger 





27 Ibid  
28 Ibid, 100 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid, 102 
31 Ibid 




into demanding political change. A recent example of this is economic sanctions and the impact 
on the middle class of Iran being “one of the important motivating forces behind the 2013 
democratic change of leadership that brought Rouhani to power.” 32 In short, neither broad nor 
smart sanctions are effective enough to use exclusively, but a combination of these sanctions can 
yield results in achieving political change.  
 
With a better understanding of what economic sanctions are and how they are supposed to 
work the logical question to follow is are economic sanctions successful in generating change? To 
answer this question, we ought to define success. For the purpose of this project, the success of 
economic sanctions will be judged by this criteria: “(1) the target state conceded to a significant 
part of the coercer's demands; (2) economic sanctions were threatened or actually applied before 
the target changed its behavior; and (3) no more credible explanation exists for the target's change 
of behavior.” 33 
 
The Use of Economic Sanctions by the United States 
 
This paper will be focusing on the United States and their use of economic sanctions 
against North Korea and Iran. There are various reasons to choose the United States over other 





32 Bergeijk, P. A. (2015). SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN – A PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT. 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). doi:https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07074.9, 54 
33 Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. International Security, 22(2), 90-136. 
doi:10.1162/isec.22.2.90, 97 




“took the lead in creating institutions” 34 such as the International Monetary Fund, World Trade 
Organization, and the World Bank. These organizations are imperative in the functioning of the 
global economy and the United States has tremendous clout within these institutions. In addition, 
the United States has the largest economy in the world. This allows the United States to generate 
significant economic pressure on targeted states. Lastly, and arguably the most important for this 
research project is the relationship the United States has with Iran and North Korea. The 
literature suggests that economic sanctions are effective with “states that are dependent on the 
United States economically and/or militarily.” 35 Most notable examples of this relationship with 
the United States are South Korea and Taiwan. The fact that the United States is adversarial to 
both Iran and North Korea provides this research project with a unique approach to economic 
sanctions and non-proliferation. 
 
  The start of US sanctions began when the United States passed the Trading with the 
Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA) which allowed “exceptionally broad presidential power to regulate 
international trade and finance, and to freeze foreign-owned assets of all kinds. Excepted were 
commerce and assets wholly within the United States.” 36 While a powerful piece of legislation 





34 Mastanduno, Michael. “Economics and Security in Statecraft and Scholarship.” International Organization 52, 
no. 4 (1998): 825–54. https://doi.org/10.1162/002081898550761, 832 
35 Miller, Nicholas L. “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions.” International Organization 68, no. 4 
(2014): 913–44. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818314000216, 938 
36 Hufbauer, G. (1998). Economic Sanctions. Cambridge University Press on Behalf of the American Society of 
International Law, 92, 332-335. doi:https://www.jstor.org/stable/25659235, 332 




the 20th century. This would change after the end of the Cold War. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the United States found itself alone at the top of the food chain. With communism 
suffering a serious setback capitalism would soon take control of the global economy with the 
United States in a commanding position. Due to these circumstances, and the “U.S. control of the 
dollar and the dominance of the United States in the global financial system has combined with 
the growth of these flows to increase U.S. coercive economic leverage as the global economy has 
integrated.” 37 In other words, without the Soviet Union providing an alternative economic 
system the United States gained the capacity to exploit other countries' economies with greater 
results. The United States would embrace the use of sanctions in the following years after the 
Cold War. One statistic shows that “about 75 percent of the world’s nearly 200 countries were 
subject to U.S. sanctions as of 2000 ... the U.S. had placed 68 percent of the world population 
under economic sanctions.” 38 
 
The use of economic sanctions has become an effective policy tool for the United States 
and their foreign policy goals. The United States cannot become too embroiled in conflicts for the 
risk of becoming “overextended.” 39 It is true the United States boasts the world’s strongest 
military, but “adversaries are closing the technological gap with the United States and geopolitical 






38 Kim, S. H., & Martin-Hermosillo, M. (2013). The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North 
Korea. North Korean Review, 9(2), 99-110. doi:10.3172/nkr.9.2.99, 101 
39 Binnendijk, H. (2016). U.S. Constraints Limit Assertiveness. In Friends, Foes, and Future Directions. RAND 
Corporation. doi:https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt19jcj3h.10, 53 




grows.” 40 Within the 30 years since the end of the Cold War the United States has not slipped per 
se, but countries like China, India, and Russia are catching up to the United States and therefore 
the US cannot use big-stick diplomacy to solve all its problems. 
 
Another factor playing into the United States use of economic sanctions is that the United 
States is a democracy, and unlike the countries the US targets is accountable to the public. The 
general populace of the United States has become “exhausted” 41 of war because of the US 
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. One poll suggests that “52 percent of the American people 
now believe that the United States has “mostly failed” in Iraq, while 49 percent believe the war in 
Afghanistan was a mistake (up from 10 percent at the outset of the war).” 42 The American public 
has become wary of wars due to the entanglement the United States finds itself in the Middle East. 
The cost of these wars has shifted the American public to “concentrate primarily on domestic 
problems at the expense of international affairs.”43 With saying that the American public 
“expresses concern at signs of U.S. weakness”  44 and wishes for the United States to play an active 
role in international affairs. This paradox of interests suggests why economic sanctions have 
become more popular amongst various US administrations (both Republican and Democrat). 
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43 Ibid, 58 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
For the purpose of this research project, I will be employing a Most Similar System Design 
(MSSD) to analyse and compare the different outcome between Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear 
programs. The MSSD, originally developed in “J.S Mill’s (1872) classic studies Systems of Logic,” 
46 is designed to compare two or more states that are “as similar as possible, except with regard to 
the phenomenon.” 47 For the purposes of this research project, the countries being examines are 
North Korea and Iran. The phenomenon that differs between the two is each states’ respective 
nuclear program. A MSSD approach, while useful, does come with limitations. Since there are a 
relatively small number of states to examine “it will never be possible to keep constant all potential 
explanatory factors.” 48 Each state is a unique political unit. Even states that are similar, Australia 
and New Zealand for instance, have a number of differences that make an exact comparison 
difficult. Since no two states are identical no analysis can account for “all possible explanations of 
a phenomenon.” 49 To circumvent this, when using a MSSD approach the case studies ought to be 
“as similar as possible on the background variables.” 50 Similar factors like authoritarian regime, 
similar size of population, or if the state was a former colony are all examples of similar 






46 Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research.” Political Research 
Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907313077, 298 
47 Anckar, Carsten. “On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most Different Systems 
Design in Comparative Research.” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11, no. 5 (2008): 389–
401. https://doi.org/10.1080/13645570701401552, 389 
48 Ibid, 390  
49 Ibid, 393 
50 Ibid, 399 




Despite this short coming, MSSD is still an effective tool of analysis when comparing two 
or more states. MSSD’s strength comes from its ability to “eliminate a large number of potentially 
relevant explanatory variables from further analysis.” 51 Variables to explain why a phenomenon 
occurs are potentially endless, but not all variables are equally relevant to the research question. 
One way to find relevant variables is to find ones in which the cases “differ.” 52 For example, if 
the phenomenon being studied is why states use capital punishment and State A was a former 
colony while State B was not a former colony and does not use capital punishment the variable of 
colonial history can potentially explain the phenomenon of capital punishment.  
 
Justification for the cases 
 
 For this research project the two countries that will be examined are North Korea and 
Iran. The reader might ask what explains this case selection? It is true that both North Korea and 
Iran are unique countries. However, there are enough similarities between the two to justify a 
joint analysis. On a structural level both Iran and North Korea are within an anarchical 
international system. Extrapolating from this we know both Iran and North Korea will act in their 
self-interest and ensure their respective survival. Both regimes are authoritarian. The most 
obvious similarity between the two countries are their controversial nuclear programs. Both Iran 
and North Korea are seen to violate UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which declared 
“[Weapons of Mass Destruction] proliferation to be a threat to peace under Chapter 7 of the 
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prosecution of proliferation activities.” 53 As a result of their respective nuclear programs, the 
United States (with international cooperation) have applied a litany of economic sanctions on 
both countries. 
 
The similarities between the two countries run deeper than having economic sanctions 
imposed on them. Both countries since their modern inceptions (Iran post-Islamic revolution and 
North Korea since the beginning of the Korean War) have been adversaries of the United States. 
Both countries are mentioned by former President Bush in his famous ‘Axis of Evil’ speech for in 
part their nuclear ambitions. The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran also share technical 
similarities, because of their “shared reliance on AQ Khan’s proliferation and nuclear supply 
networks.” 54 Other similarities include “antecedents of sponsoring terrorism, and anti-
Americanism deeply ensconced in both regimes, there is no doubt that Iran and North Korea are 
similar in terms of the potential threat that they pose to the international community.” 55 Lastly, 
these two countries have not been subject to regime change. Iraq, the other member of the 
aforementioned Axis of Evil, and Libya were also sanctioned over fears of their nuclear programs 
(whether these fears were justified is another subject for another time), but were overthrown by a 
coalition led by the United States. These similarities help isolate the impact, or lack thereof, of 






53 Go , Myong-Hyun. “North Korea as Iran's Counterfactual: a Comparison of Iran and North Korea Sanctions .” 
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Despite similarities between the two countries, the impact of economic sanctions on the 
two countries’ nuclear program have yielded different results. North Korea has managed to shrug 
off the plethora of economic sanctions and managed to successfully detonate their first nuclear 
device for the world to see on October 9th, 2006. In spite of years of increasingly harsher economic 
sanctions and increased isolation within the international community on July 4th, 2017 North 
Korea successfully tested an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the 
continental United States of America. Iran, and their nuclear program, has taken a different route 
than North Korea’s. During the same time Iran has been under a similar level of economic pressure 
from the United States and Allies (in the form of economic sanctions) as North Korea. Despite 
this, Iran does not possess any nuclear weapons. In fact, Iran (along with China, France, Russia, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States) signed The Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, which came into effect on January 16th, 
2016. The JCPOA, in short, was an international agreement that “in return for accepting the 
restrictions on [Iran’s nuclear] programs, Iran was freed from sanctions imposed by the 
international community and individual states related to its non-compliance with its obligations 
under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).” 56 In fact, it was the United States, not Iran, that decided 
to leave the deal on May 8th, 2018. It would be two more years after the US withdrawal that Iran 
officially withdrew from the JCPOA. From these two cases, we can see how these adversaries of 





56 Garwin , Richard L. “The Iran Deal in Six Minutes .” American Philosophical Society 160, no. 2 (2016): 201–4. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26159213, 201 




of these two states we can see why economic sanctions have appeared to work for reaching a deal 





 To understand why sanctions have had such a different effect on each state’s nuclear 
program four variables will be explored. These four variables are economic vulnerability, 
security vulnerability, international cooperation, and political contestation. Each variable will be 
explored further in a comparison and contrast for North Korea and Iran. However, it is important 
to define the variables and how they relate back to central research question. 
 
Economic vulnerability relates to the economic concerns of the targeted state. Since 
economic sanctions by definition are economic tools of foreign policy it would be fruitful to 
measure the economic impact the imposed sanctions have on the targeted country. If a state was 
dependent on exports and the global economy for economic growth, then sanctions will be a 
potent policy tool. To contrast this, if a state does not have the same economic concerns then the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions might be diminished.  
 
Security vulnerability is the foil to economic vulnerability. Similar to economic 
vulnerability, security vulnerabilitly looks at the targeted states’ security capabilities and 
concerns. If a state is relatively stronger than its neighbors, then that state will have relatively 
low security vulnerability. This variable is an important contrast to economic vulnerability 
because the pursuit of nuclear weapons is a security issue, but the study is focusing on economic 
sanctions, and economic tool, and their effectiveness at preventing nuclear proliferation. 




Therefore, if a state were to have low security vulnerability while having a high economic 
vulnerability then economic sanctions ought to be more effective than if the inverse (high 
security vulnerability and low economic vulnerability) were true. Due to the relationship of these 
two variables they will be examined within the same chapter.  
 
International cooperation affects how effective the international community implements 
economic sanctions on the targeted state. Despite the United States tremendous economic power 
economic sanctions are an international effort. If one or more states were to implement sanctions 
in an inadequate way, or not at all, then this will seriously hamper the effectiveness of the 
sanctions. If other states employ an uneven application of these economic sanctions than the 
effectiveness of said economic sanctions will be diminished. One country in particular, China, 
and its commitment to implementation of economic sanctions can determine the effectiveness of 
the economic sanctions.  
 
Political contestation refers to the level of participation the average citizen can enact 
within the targeted regime. Despite the fact that both regimes of Iran and North Korea are 
authoritarian this is still an important variable to explore. Economic sanctions, specifically broad 
sanctions, are designed to target ordinary citizens to galvanize citizens to pressure the regime 
into making concessions. However, this cannot be achieved if the regime places heavy 
restrictions and punishments on its citizens. Therefore, determining the level of political 
contestation will help determine the effectiveness of economic sanctions.   
 




While all four of these variables are important to understanding the difference in the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions on the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, economic 
and security vulnerabilities are slightly more valuable to the overall study than international 
cooperation and political contestation. Since this project is looking into how effective economic 
sanctions are at curbing nuclear proliferation examining the economic and security 
vulnerabilities of the targeted states is important. Without economic vulnerability it would be 
hard to understand the economic impact these sanctions have on the economy of the targeted 
states. In addition, without evaluating the security concerns of the targeted state it would be 
difficult to understand why the targeted state would be pursuing a nuclear program in the face of 
economic pressure. An important relationship of this study is understanding the relationship 
between economic and security vulnerabilities to the respective state.  
 
However, that is not to say the other two variables, international cooperation and political 
contestation, are not important to this research project. Political contestation is important to the 
overall study because it provides a catalyst between economic sanctions and tangible change in 
the targeted regime. Without examining the population of the targeted state and their potential 
impact then it would be impossible to understand how economic sanctions impact (or lack 
impact) on the respective state and their nuclear program. This is one reason why neorealism 
falls short as a theoretical framework for this research project.  
 
Lastly, comes international cooperation. This variable is interesting because the lack of 
international cooperation can appear to be sufficient enough to negate the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions. Especially if a state with tremendous economic clout, such as China, does 




not implement these economic sanctions. However, whether that statement is true or not depends 
on the context of the relationship between the two states. If China were to ignore the economic 
sanctions imposed on North Korea the economic sanctions regime would likely fail. However, if 
China were to ignore the economic sanctions regime against Iran the sanctions would be 
impacted but would not be as detrimental to the overall sanction effort. This is because China 
trades a lot more with North Korea than Iran. The other side of the same coin is that North Korea 
depends heavily on China whereas Iran has a plethora of states to conduct trade with (most 
notably members of the European Union). An uneven application of the economic sanctions by a 
number of states will hinder the overall effort. The absence of one key state and its effect on the 
overall economic sanctions regime is more context dependent. The impact the absence will have 
on the sanctions will be determined by how much the targeted state depends on the abstaining 
state. Economic sanctions are more effective when there is a coherent approach from each state, 
but the absence of one state does not necessarily invalidate the entire effort.  
 
To better understand the difference of outcomes, it would be beneficial to examine the 
history of both programs. This next section will examine the progress, set-backs, economic 
sanctions, and diplomatic developments in the history of Iran and North Korea’s nuclear 
programs. By doing this (hopefully) certain patterns and tactics will appear which can be further 
explored to understand the success with Iran and the failures of North Korea. By extension, 
learning what did and did not work with these two cases can (hopefully) shed light to make 
economic sanctions more effective in curbing nuclear proliferation. 
 
 




Chapter 4: The History of North Korea’s Nuclear Program: 
 
Cold War and the Clinton Administration 
 
North Korea’s desire for nuclear weapons started “long before the end of the Cold War.” 
57 In the early years of the Cold War the Soviet Union provided North Korea assistance in starting 
their nuclear program. In the 1950s the Soviet Union would train “North Korean scientists and 
engineers, enabling the DPRK to acquire the “basic knowledge” to initiate a nuclear program.” 58 
In 1959 the Soviet Union would sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with North Korea and would 
provide “the North with basic nuclear training and technology.” 59 However, North Korea’s 
aspirations were met with challenges as the Soviet Union and China (North Korea’s closest allies) 
were unresponsive to North Korea’s wishes. In 1985 North Korea, joining South Korea and others, 
signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, but did not “complete a safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” 60 1989 marked the end of the Cold War and thus 
ended the Soviet “economic support of North Korea.” 61 In the same year North Korea began “new 
construction at a nuclear complex near the North Korean town of Yong Byon.” 62 
 
After the Cold War the newly abandoned North Korea would find itself in a US dominated 
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the 1992 with the “South-North Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.” 63 The agreement between the two Koreas entailed that neither country would be 
allowed to “test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons or 
to possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. They also agree to mutual 
inspections for verification.” 64  
 
In the following years tensions would rise as North Korea “announced its intentions to 
withdraw from the NPT.” 65 This announcement of North Korea withdrawing from the NPT would 
trigger the First Nuclear Crisis. Due to “intense negotiations” 66 between the United States and 
North Korea, the Clinton administration and the Kim Regime would come to the Agreed 
Framework in October 1994. For ”freezing Pyongyang's nuclear activities under International 
Atomic Energy Agency supervision, in return for supplies of heavy fuel oil and promises to build 
proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor.” 67 With the exception of the United States agreeing to “the 
first significant easing of economic sanctions against North Korea since the end of the Korean 
War” 68 in June of 2000 there was little change in North Korea’s nuclear program during the last 
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The Bush Administration 
 
The fact that there were no major advancements in North Korea’s nuclear problem during 
the Clinton administration is something to note. However, no tangible agreements or reductions in 
North Korea’s nuclear program would cause problems for the more assertive Bush administration. 
This administration would use economic sanctions more often than the previous administration. 
For example, the Bush administration would “impose sanctions on North Korea’s Changgwang 
Sinyong Corporation for violation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000” 69 multiple times for 
largely symbolic” 70 purposes. In 2003 North Korea announced that they would withdraw “from 
the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).” 71 This announcement would start the talks between 
the Koreas, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. These talks would be known as the Six-
Party Talks.  
 
The Six-Party talks would start off floundering due to the United States’ insistence that 
North Korea “dismantle its nuclear programs” 72 as a prerequisite for economic aid. The talks 
appeared to be failing until the United States threatened to impose sanctions on the Banco Delta 
Asia. The United States Treasury threatened to use Section 311, the Treasury’s ability to 
“designate a financial institution or jurisdiction as being of ‘primary money laundering concern,” 
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“associated with missile proliferation, unrecorded gold sales, and allegedly Kim Jong-il’s political 
slush fund.” 74 The threat of the US Treasury taking action against Banco Delta Asia led to 
prominent clients like “Japan’s Bank of Tokyo, and Mitsubishi and Mizuho Corporation Bank” 75 
and the only South Korean Bank involved, “The Korea exchange Bank,” 76 to cease transactions 
with the bank. This “run on the bank”77 caused Banco Delta Asia to lose “34% of deposits within 
days.” 78 As a result, the Macau government froze “accounts that Treasury had identified as 
suspect” 79 namely those associated with the North Korean regime. This was a big financial blow 
to the North Korean regime and Kim Jong-Il personal finances. 
 
On October 9th 2006, North Korea conducted an “underground nuclear test near the village 
of Punggye.” 80 In response the UNSC would pass Resolution 1718 which entailed inspection of 
all North Korean cargo and more importantly all members “freeze immediately the funds, other 
financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories” 81 The UNSC resolution 
and Banco Delta Asia incident would make North Korea return to the stalled six-party talks.”82 
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and North Korea over “funds frozen by the United States in Banco Delta Asia.” 84 Ultimately 
denuclearization would gain little traction during the Bush administration due to mistrust between 
North Korea and the United States. North Korea would not denuclearize without significant easing 
of economic sanctions. The United States was not willing to comply with North Korea’s demands. 
Matters were only made worse when North Korea successfully tested a nuclear device. From that 
point on, denuclearization became harder to achieve. 
 
The Obama administration 
 
The Obama administration would see a continuation of the deterioration of talks between 
North Korea and the United States. Early in the Obama administration North Korea announced 
that not only would North Korea withdraw from the Six-Party talks, but also “will no longer be 
bound” 85 to any previous agreements. North Korea would continue to develop their nuclear and 
missile technology despite mounting economic pressure from the UNSC. Efforts to bring North 
Korea back to talks would ultimately be unsuccessful and by 2016 North Korea claimed to have 
developed and “detonated a hydrogen bomb.” 86  
 
The Trump Administration 
 
During the Trump administration tensions between North Korea and the United States 












fury” 87 if North Korea launched an attack against the United States. Rhetoric from both sides 
became increasingly hostile as North Korea developed an intercontinental ballistic missile with 
the “range of about 10,400km.” 88 With this range North Korea could strike “Los Angeles, 
Denver and Chicago.” 89 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), with the United States 
taking the charge, would pass harsh sanctions on the North Korean regime. Under Resolution 
2397 the UNSC would impose “additional sanctions on North Korea, including cutting refined 
petroleum imports by nearly 90 percent, limiting crude oil exports to 4 million barrels and 
mandating the expulsion of North Korean workers from other countries in two years or less.” 90  
 
In a surprising turn of events, tensions between North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and 
US president Donald Trump would ease significantly. The decrease in tensions would lead to a 
historic meeting of Kim Jong-Un and Donald Trump in Singapore 91 in June of 2018. Another 
meeting with the two leaders would take place in February of 2019, but both meetings would 
produce “insufficient progress” 92 in denuclearizing North Korea. The major stumbling block in 
negotiations was an old one which was North Korea's desire for “sanctions to be lifted "in their 
entirety" in exchange for partial denuclearization.” 93 Despite good intentions, the Trump 




















As it stands today, economic sanctions, and the promise of lifting said economic sanctions, 
have proven to be ineffective motivating forces for North Korea to denuclearize. Despite decades 
of economic sanctions and diplomacy the international community has not been able to get North 
Korea to denuclearize. In fact, in the face of international isolation and crippling economic 
sanctions North Korea has not only been able to develop a nuclear program, but expand upon it to 
the point of targeting the mainland United States. While advancements of North Korea’s missile 
and nuclear technology was more prominent during times of tension North Korea would often use 
times of relatively low tensions to test technology often catching South Korea and the United States 
by surprise. 
 
A major stumbling block between North Korea and the United States is the issue of trust. 
Without nuclear weapons North Korea would feel defenseless against the much stronger militaries 
of South Korea and the United States. Without a method of deterrence North Korea would have to 
rely on the word of the United States not to take military action. However, the Kim regime 
remembers vividly Gaddafi’s denuclearization and the US led coalition to depose the Gaddafi 
regime that took place shortly after the denuclearization. Therefore, for North Korea to begin 
denuclearization the United States must lift significant economic sanctions. The condition in order 
for the US to ease economic sanctions is North Korea must begin denuclearization. These tensions 
have been exacerbated over the years due to continued missile tests from the North and continued 
military drills conducted by the US and South Korea. On the surface the Trump administration 
appeared to have shaken up the dynamic between the North and the US by at first ratcheting 




“sanctions to an unparalleled degree” 94 plus, the fiery rhetoric pushing tensions to uncomfortable 
heights. Then in a surprising move, Donald Trump met with Kim Jong-Un becoming the first 
sitting US president to meet with the leader of North Korea. While historic, these summits 
produced little “tangible outcomes.” 95 One could argue these summits have only benefitted North 
Korea as meeting with a sitting US president can be viewed “as a means of strengthening Kim’s 
domestic and international position, particularly in respect of its chronic legitimacy deficit in the 
inter-Korean comparison.” 96 North Korea continues to conduct tests as economic sanctions remain 
in place. 
 
While it is unlikely the United States and the international community will simply give up 
on denuclearizing North Korea it is equally unlikely North Korea will simply give up their nuclear 
weapons in return for modest economic relief. Economic sanctions have been somewhat effective 
in bringing North Korea to the table, as seen in 1994 with the Light Water Reactors and the Banco 
Delta Asia incident, but they have not stopped North Korea from continuing to develop and expand 
their nuclear arsenal. Despite crippling economic pressure North Korea has detonated hydrogen 
weapons and developed ICBM technologies. When new sanctions were imposed North Korea 
would simply respond with a new test whether it be a nuclear test or a missile test (with potential 
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the United States “will need to learn to live with Pyongyang as a de facto nuclear power, at least 
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Chapter 5: The History of Iran’s Nuclear Program: 
 
Pre-Islamic revolution 1950s – 1979 
 
The start of Iran’s nuclear program began in the 1950s with the help of the United States. 
The Shah of Iran “received technical assistance under the U.S. Atoms for Peace program.” 98 
Under this agreement, with help from the United States, Iran received “a nuclear research reactor 
in Tehran and power plants.” 99  As the name of the program suggests, the nuclear technology 
provided to Iran was for civilian purposes. In 1968 Iran, along with 50 other countries, signed the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “agreeing to never become a nuclear-weapon state.” 100 In 
1973 the Shah expanded Iran’s nuclear program by creating the Atomic Energy Organization of 
Iran (AEOI). The AEOI was tasked with the installation of “3,000 MWE of nuclear power in 
Iran by the end of the century.” 101 The Shah would also make deals with countries like France, 
Namibia, and South Africa to expand their nuclear capabilities. 102 By the time the Iranian 
Revolution occurred Iran had “developed an impressive baseline capability in nuclear 
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Post Islamic Revolution – 2002 
 
In the turbulence of the revolution “much of Iran’s nuclear talent fled the country in the 
wake of the Revolution.” 104 On a systemic level, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini held a general 
“opposition to nuclear technology” 105 which lead to the near “[disintegration]” 106 of the Iranian 
nuclear program. The renewed interest in their nuclear program was sparked by the Iran-Iraq war 
(1980-1988). Fears of Saddam Hussein “pursuing a nuclear program in Iraq” 107 spurred Iran to 
restart their nuclear program in 1984. The United States, taking notice of Iran’s nuclear build up, 
grew suspicious of Iran and the true intentions of the program. The United States used their 
international clout to convince “potential suppliers to limit nuclear cooperation with Iran.” 108 
These efforts saw moderate success as China “did not ... supply Iran with the research reactor 
(which would have been suitable for plutonium production.)” 109 The United States also prevented 
the following countries from cooperating with Iran: “Argentina, India, Spain, Germany and 
France”110 Further steps were taken against Iran when the United States imposed sanctions on 
“foreign companies with investments in Iran.” 111  
 
In 2002 “the existence of undeclared nuclear facilities in Iran, including Natanz Enrichment 


















construction at Arak, and the names of various individuals and front companies involved with the 
nuclear program.” 112 With this information released the United States accused Iran of secretly in 
“pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.” 113 As the information was leaked, and the United States 
prepared to invade Iraq, Iran sought to ease tensions and agreed to an “inspections by the IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency).” 114  
 
The Invasion of Iraq – End of the Bush Presidency 
 
Following the invasion of Iraq, Iran suspended their nuclear program. 115 Iran even allowed 
the IAEA to inspect nuclear facilities and to “determine the history of Iran's nuclear program.” 116 
The move was welcomed by the international community and there were two inspections that took 
place in September and October of 2003. The inspections revealed “Iran's new declarations 
contradicted the Agency's previous information about its nuclear program.” 117 These inspections 
caused greater scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program and in order to “avoid referral to the UN Security 
Council” 118 Iran entered talks with Britain, France and Germany. Iran agreed to continue the 
temporary suspension of enrichment and conversion activities, including the manufacture, 
installation, testing, and operation of centrifuges, and committed to working with the EU-3 to find 
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Security Council and economic sanctions. The United States would take a more aggressive stance 
towards Iran. George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13382 “blocking the financial assets of 
individuals and entities supporting WMD proliferation. Four Iranian entities were designated as 
agents of proliferation concern, including the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the 
Aerospace Industries Organization.” 120  
 
The relationship between the international community and Iran over the Iranian nuclear 
program would take a turn for the worse as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected President of Iran 
in August of 2005. Despite pressure from the UN Security Council Ahmadinejad was in favour of 
further “development of Iran’s nuclear program.” 121 The following year Iran would act more 
defiant with regards to their nuclear program which caused “negotiations with European and 
American officials [to] collapsed.” 122 There would be little change in Iran's nuclear situation due 
to attitudes between Iran and the United States remaining consistently belligerent during the 
remaining years of the Bush presidency. 
 
The Obama Administration 
 
The Obama administration would take a less abrasive approach in dealing with Iran. Efforts 
to restart talks failed to get off the ground in December 2010, due to Iran’s insistence of “lifting of 
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This precondition would be a factor into future talks falling apart. In 2011 the IAEA released a 
document that detailed many factors of Iran’s nuclear program. The most damning of the 
information released was the "possible military dimensions" to Iran's nuclear program.” 124 Shortly 
after the release of this document the United States and United Kingdom spearheaded a new round 
of sanctions against Iran. These sanctions were designed to “cut Iran off from the international 
financial system, announcing coordinated sanctions aimed at its central bank and commercial 
banks.” 125 In addition, the United States took unilateral action and imposed “sanctions on 
companies involved in Iran’s nuclear industry, as well as on its petrochemical and oil industries.” 
126  
In July of 2012 the European Union implemented sanctions targeting Iran’s oil and natural 
gas industries, the lifeline of Iran’s economy. These sanctions “severely [restricted] Iran's ability 
to sell its most important export.” 127 In addition to Iran's oil and gas sectors, the United States 
imposed sanctions on Iran's "shipping trade, intensifying existing sanctions intended to choke off 
the revenue that Iran reaps from its two largest export industries.” 128 These sanctions were 
effective in disrupting Iran’s economy. In January 2013 “Iran’s oil minister, Rostam Qasemi, 
acknowledged for the first time that petroleum exports and sales had fallen by at least 40 percent 
















Rial (the currency of Iran) plunged “40 percent.” 130 The rapid inflation of the Rial created fears 
among citizens and government officials that the currency would be rendered “worthless.” 131 
 
Economic sanctions continued to harm Iran’s economy. By April of 2013 “prices of staples 
are set to increase by as much as 60 percent because of the currency change.” 132  The United States 
kept the momentum going by implementing harsher economic sanctions. The United States 
introduced legislation that would “deny the Iran government access to an estimated $100 billion 
worth of its own money parked in overseas banks.” 133 This did little to help Iran’s financial 
stability. As of May 2013, the IAEA reports that Iran’s nuclear program “has made significant 
progress across the board in its nuclear program.” 134  
 
Hassan Rouhani to the Joint Plan of Comprehensive Action 
 
A turning point with Iran’s nuclear program comes with Hassan Rouhani’s accession to 
President of Iran in August of 2013. Rouhani, a moderate in Iranian politics, would opt for a 
“conciliatory approach to the world” 135 over Iran’s nuclear program. Talks between the United 
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on to slow down “its accumulation of enriched uranium”137 as a show of good faith as well as other 
actions to improve relations with the United States and the international community. 
 
In November of the same year the IAEA announced that Iran had “put the brakes on their 
nuclear expansion.” 138 On November 24th, the United states, and five other countries, announce 
an agreement with Iran to “temporarily freeze Iran’s nuclear program and lay the foundation for a 
more sweeping agreement.” 139 This agreement would see Iran halt their nuclear program for six 
months. In the six-month period, Iran and the P5 + 1 (the five permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council and Germany) would “pursue a more comprehensive accord” 140 to 
ensure a peaceful resolution to Iran’s nuclear program. 
 
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
 
After grueling negotiations, Iran and the P5 + 1 came to an agreement known as the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or more commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. In 
short, the JCPOA is an agreement with Iran stating that “in return for accepting the restrictions on 
its programs, Iran was freed from sanctions imposed by the international community and 
individual states related to its non-compliance with its obligations under the Nonproliferation 
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of non-proliferation. The JCPOA “for the first time, explicitly bans nuclear weapons R&D, rather 
than only their manufacture.” 142  
 
The deal was a landmark in not only Iranian-US relations, but also in the field of non-
proliferation. However, as Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, stated “we do not have 
a perfect deal.” 143 Criticism of the deal was not uncommon among Israeli and American 
lawmakers. 144 A systemic criticism of the deal was that it did not solve the issue of Iran and their 
nuclear program, but merely “postponed a showdown for a decade of so.” 145 This is in reference 
to the sunset clause of the deal which only places limitations on Iran’s nuclear program until 2030. 
146 Critics argue that this sunset clause merely “postponed a showdown for a decade or so.” 147 The 
easing of economic sanctions will stop the economic “momentum” 148 that has been taking a toll 
on Iran’s economy. At the end of the agreement Iran “will be much closer to producing numerous 
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The Trump Administration 
 
In 2016 the IAEA issued a statement “declaring Iran to be in compliance with all of its 
obligations under the JCPOA.” 150 During the campaign Donald Trump vowed to “dismantle the 
disastrous deal with Iran.” 151 Other members of the JCPOA, most notably French President 
Macron, 152 lobbied the President to stick with the deal but to no avail. In May of 2018, after years 
of uncertainty, the United States “would cease implementing the JCPOA and begin to reimpose 
nuclear-related sanctions on Iran.” 153 US companies with ties to Iran had only 180 days to “sever 
contracts” 154 with Iran. Without the United States, the driving economic force of the agreement, 
Iran “stated that Iran plans to discuss options for preserving the deal with the P5+1 nations.” 155 
While the remaining members discussed possible solutions the United States imposed two rounds 
of sanctions the first round of sanctions in August 2018 targeted Iranian “targeted automobiles, 
foreign currency, and gold.” 156 The second round in November 2018 was “aimed at Iran’s oil 
exports and banks.” 157  
 
Iran, growing impatient with the remaining P5 + 1, would take steps that would violate the 
JCPOA. The most substantial of these violations was taken in November of 2019. Iran announced 
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Fordow.” 158 These activities allowed Iran to acquire “a stockpile of over 500 kg of LEU,” (a basic 
ingredient to fabricate nuclear fuel.) 159 With this amount of LEU the Institute for Science and 
International Security (ISIS) “has estimated that Iran’s breakout time has already been reduced 
from 8-12 months to 6-10.” 160 It is important to note that with every violation the Iranian regime 
made it clear that these “violations are reversible, and that Iran will return to the terms of the deal 
if the US lifts all sanctions.” 161 These violations committed are not necessarily a rejection of the 
deal, but rather this is Iran’s idea to “to have sanctions lifted by pressuring the Europeans to do 
more to help.” 162 
 
The goal of the Trump administration’s campaign of increasingly economic sanctions was 
to put Iran in a position to “relent and make concessions on its nuclear program, missile 
development, and regional activities.” 163 While economic pressures are taking their toll on the 
Iranian economy there is little evidence to suggest that Iran will be willing to negotiate with the 
United States after the abrupt withdrawal from the JCPOA. In fact, in January 2020 Iran announced 
it would no longer “abide by the operational restrictions on the low-enriched uranium stockpile, 
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development.” 164 In addition, recent economic sanctions might push Iran into withdrawing “from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” 165 Leaving the NPT has always been a “fringe idea” 
166 among the hardliners in Iranian politics, but recent developments have made the idea more 
salient among a “surprisingly large spectrum of Iranian society.” 167 Since November of 2019 “Iran 
has nearly tripled its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 1,021 kilograms (1.1 tons).” 168 With 
this amount Iran could make a nuclear bomb. 
 
Iran has threatened to leave the NPT if “U.N. Security Council sanctions are reimposed.” 
169 While it is unclear if leaving the NPT Iran would immediately pursue making nuclear weapons, 
or rather use rejoining the NPT as a “bargaining chip,” 170 this is a clear breakdown of the JCPOA 
and a step in the wrong direction for non-proliferation. Those in favour of leaving the NPT point 
out that Iran shares North Korea’s position in the world, “sanctions, pariah status,” 171 but without 
the security benefit of nuclear weapons. However, Iran is aware of potential backlashes of leaving 
the NPT, and pursuing nuclear weapons. For starters, North Korea has not “been able to negotiate 
tangible sanctions relief.” 172 Another concern for Iran is that leaving the NPT would isolate Iran 
even more. Withdrawing from the NPT would make China and Russia turn “against” 173 Iran. 





















The strong and consistent approach from the United States and the international community 
in imposing economic sanctions have produced meaningful breakthroughs in halting Iran’s nuclear 
program. The most notable example of this is the JCPOA, in which Iran would make meaningful 
concessions with regards to their nuclear program in return for significant easing of sanctions. As 
the economic sanctions have taken their toll on the Iranian economy it has become clear that Iran 
values a strong economy over the development of nuclear weapons. Even after the United States 
left the JCPOA Iran would continue to follow the guidelines of the JCPOA in the promise of 
European support to circumvent US sanctions. Ultimately, Iran would leave the deal two years 
after the United States due to the Europeans being unable to provide Iran with a viable mechanism. 
The JCPOA would ultimately prove to be a failure. However, the failure of the agreement cannot 
be blamed on Iran, but rather the United States. In fact, despite the United States leaving, and with 
it the bulk of economic incentives for Iran, Iran remained part of the JCPOA for 2 more years. 
This illuminates how important the easing of economic sanctions is to Iran. The future of Iran’s 
nuclear program remains uncertain due to high tensions between the United States and Iran, and 
the prospects of a return to the JCPOA remains slim. The unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran by 
the United States are not necessarily ineffective at pressuring Iran, but without a coordinated 
international effort these sanctions are unlikely to produce any meaningful concessions. In other 
words, these sanctions are akin to not striking when the iron is hot. However, with Iran’s worsening 
economic situation there is a chance that Iran would be willing to make concessions to their nuclear 
program in return for easing of sanctions. 
 





Exploring Possible reasons for the Different Results of North Korea and Iran’s Nuclear 
Programs: 
 
The economic sanctions imposed on North Korea and Iran shared a similar trajectory, 
meaning they grew with intensity over time targeting more and more sectors of the economies of 
Iran and North Korea. At the same time both countries have become increasingly isolated in the 
international community. However, these two countries, more specifically their nuclear programs, 
have reacted differently to the continued economic pressures. Why have sanctions against Iran 
succeeded, albeit moderate successes, but have failed in containing North Korea’s nuclear pursuit? 
The answer to this question is fourfold. Since North Korea and Iran are very unique countries and 
have their own special set of interests and needs it would be difficult and inaccurate to claim that 
one factor is responsible for the success or failure of economic sanctions in limiting their nuclear 
programs. Possible explanations for the differences in the case of North Korea and Iran are 
economic vulnerabilities, security vulnerabilities, international cooperation, and lastly limited 





















Chapter 6: Economic versus Security Vulnerabilities 
 
The Economy of Iran 
 
The economy of Iran is more akin to other modern economies than North Korea’s. 
However, there are a few idiosyncratic features of Iran’s economy that make it unique. One cannot 
talk about the economy of Iran without bringing up Iran’s dependency on oil and natural gas. With 
“10 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 15 percent of its gas reserves” 174 Iran’s 
economy is “dependent on oil” 175 and by extension trade. Iran’s oil dependency is not as dramatic 
as its neighbours due to Iran’s “well-developed industrial sector and an agricultural sector that 
produces much of the food the nation consumes.” 176 Due to these factors and a population of 80 
million Iran is the “second largest economy in the Middle East,” 177 second only to Egypt. All of 
these attributes are ideal for a strong economy. In fact, “Goldman Sachs has asserted that Iran has 
the potential to become one of the world’s largest economies.” 178  
 
The potential of Iran’s economic prosperity has been stifled due to “corruption, 
mismanagement,” 179 and of course, economic sanctions. In recent years, Iran’s economy has 
suffered from hyperinflation and high unemployment, especially among the youth. In 2017 youth 
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growth.” 181 Continued economic decline and the price of fuel rising “triggered” 182 protests in 
November 2019. To better understand the deteriorating nature of Iran’s economy we ought to look 
at the components that make up the economy. A large portion of the economy, up to ”60 percent,” 
183 is controlled by state owned enterprises (SOE). These SOEs have close ties to Iran’s supreme 
leader and the state’s ”security forces.” 184 These SOEs play a dominant role in the country’s “oil 
and gas” 185 sector. These SOEs branch out into “large-scale industry, foreign trade, major 
minerals, banking insurance, power generation, radio and television, telephone serves, aviation, 
shipping, and railroads.” 186 SOEs have a considerable advantage over private companies due to 
their close relationship with the government that allows them to play by a different set of rules. 
These advantages have allowed the public sector to “crowd out” 187 the private sector. These forces 
in Iran have denied the country from greater “economic liberalization” 188 in favour of greater 
government control in the economy. 
 
In addition to Iran’s plethora of state-owned enterprises there are the Bonyads. Bonyads 
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are roughly 120 Bonyads in Iran that have the privilege of being “tax exempt organizations that 
get government subsidies and religious donations.” 190 Bonyads are under the direct control of the 
Supreme Leader and their operations include everything from “farms to hotels to shipping lines, 
and are not subject to audits or the nation’s accounting laws.” 191 With the government playing 
such a large part in the economy it has created an uneven playing ground for private businesses. It 
is perfectly legal for Iranians to “own property and establish private businesses,” 192 but there are 
other roadblocks that prevent Iranians from competing on the same level as the Bonyads and SOEs. 
One factor is that SOEs and Bonyads can underprice private businesses due to access of the 
regime's treasury and certain tax exemptions make operating costs much lower than for individuals 
who wish to start private businesses. The Iranian government pays over $60 billion in “subsidies” 
193 to these various organizations. 
 
The Iranian economy has various flaws, but that is not to say that there are not positives. 
From the end of the revolution of 1979 until 2016, “life expectancy jumped from 54 years to 75 
years; schooling jumped from 9 years to 15 years.” 194 Compared to some of Iran’s neighbours the 
citizens of Iran live a relatively prosperous life. This prosperity is not equally spread though. As 
is common with most economies, income inequality is becoming more problematic. When 
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wealth was controlled by just 300 people.” 195 While President Ahmadinejad was known for his 
bold exaggerations the inequality in Iran is palpable. In Tehran, the capital of Iran, “luxury 
apartments and fancy cars line the streets in the wealthy neighborhoods in North Tehran while 
families cram together in small, rented rooms in the poorer South Tehran.” 196 the conditions are 
much worse in Iran’s rural areas. 
 
Economic sanctions imposed on Iran by the United States and allies have had an “adverse 
effect on the Iranian economy.” 197 Iran’s economy is very dependent on their oil and natural gas 
exports and these economic sanctions have drastically limited Iran’s ability to do just that. 
Economic sanctions have limited “international financial transactions” 198 which has made it 
increasingly difficult to get Iran’s oil in the global market. The most notable of these restrictions 
was Iran’s “forced exit” 199 from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT). Denying access to the “worldwide messaging system used for 
international money transfers has severely curtailed the flow of oil revenue into the economy.” 200 
Other targets for economic sanctions include “the EU oil embargo as well as banking and insurance 
restrictions.” 201 Sanctions have undoubtedly harmed Iran’s ability to sell its oil and natural gas to 
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plummeted.” 202 Within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, commonly 
referred to as just OPEC, Iran “lost its position as second-largest producer.” 203 Economic 
sanctions, as well the already “existing problems” 204 of government mismanagement and 
corruption, have “magnified Iran’s economic woes.” 205  
 
Economic sanctions have played a significant role in isolating Iran and reducing their 
“exposure to the global economy.” 206 Since economic sanctions have ramped up Iran has suffered 
significant GDP loss. Continued economic stagnation and growing discontent among Iranians are 
believed to have “brought Rouhani to power.” 207 Rouhani in power was “somewhat successful in 
convincing the population of the potentially fruitful outcome of the ongoing nuclear negotiations.” 
208 Due to Rouhani’s efforts, as well as intense negotiations with the P5 + 1, the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action was signed. In return for restrictions to Iran’s controversial nuclear 
program the P5 + 1 agreed to lift certain economic sanctions on Iran. The agreement allowed 
“Tehran to expand oil exports, attract greater foreign investment, and increase trade.” 209 Since 
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sanctions on Iran, oil exports have been “slashed” 210 and it has pushed Iran “into a deepening 
recession.” 211   
 
Economic sanctions from the West have forced Iran to look to other countries in order to 
stay afloat. China, a rising power, has been an obvious choice for Iran. In 2009, China was Iran’s 
largest trading partner importing “16.5 percent of Iranian exports” 212 which consisted of mostly 
oil. China has invested heavily in Iran’s energy sector. In 2009 China made deals with the Iranian 
regime for “$30 billion.” 213 China is in a unique position to help alleviate Iran’s economic woes. 
In 2018 when the Trump Administration reimposed economic sanctions on Iran there were 
“exemptions”214 made for China and India. 
 
China and Iran’s economic relationship has grown over the past years because of China’s 
demand for energy and the lack of alternatives for Iran. However, the relationship is not limited to 
the selling of just oil and natural gases. In fact, China has involved Iran in the ambitious Belt and 
Road initiative. Due to Iran’s vital geographical location China has provided “$1.8 billion to 
establish a high-speed rail connection linking key Iranian cities of Tehran, Qom, and Isfahan, and 
another $1.5 billion to electrify the rail line from Tehran to the city of Mashad.” 215 Despite the 
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member of the P5 + 1 that negotiated the Iran Nuclear Deal, and does not wish for Iran to possess 
nuclear weapons. In addition, the United States has “pressured” 216 China into isolating Iran over 
their nuclear program. For Iran’s part there is hesitation to accept China with open arms. Iranians 
have expressed discontent with China over “failures to deliver on promised deals.” 217 Domestic 
manufactures in Iran have expressed concern that Chinese imports “undercut local 
manufacturing.” 218 While China’s economic relationship with Iran has helped the regime, these 
problems have caused the Iranian leadership to become wary of “relying too much on China and 
have been trying to work with a greater spectrum of foreign companies.” 219  
 
China, despite its rising international clout, can only do some much to alleviate Iran’s 
economic troubles. Much of the power over Iran remains in the hands of the United States and its 
European allies. If the United States, France, Germany, and Britain were to “cut off all 
communication with the country – flights, telephone, internet, banking – along with the countries 
that would follow their leadership, Iran would be compelled to yield.” 220 China, and Iran’s other 
friend of convenience Russia, would have few options to mitigate the economic damage. That is 
of course if Beijing and Moscow are politically motivated to stand up for Iran, but previous actions 
have shown that these two countries are not “enthusiastic about standing against the West’s actions 
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To summarize, the nature of Iran’s economy has made it particularly vulnerable to 
economic sanctions. Its heavy dependence on oil and gas exports and the systemic corruption have 
created economic woes in the country that are amplified by continued economic sanctions. Due to 
renewed sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration Iran’s economy “shrank by 9.5 percent” 
222 in 2019 and inflation continues to devalue the Rial. The continuing economic crisis has 
“adversely affected the middle class” 223 of Iran and has led to growing political tensions. As 
mentioned earlier, in November 2019 the government was no longer able to afford subsidizing fuel 
prices and this led to riots. Iran is an authoritarian state, but Iranians have come to expect a standard 
of living that the government cannot provide due to mounting economic pressures. This has put 
the Iranian government in “intense internal pressure to improve the economy and spread the gains.” 
224 The government must be able to provide economic relief for the middle and working classes, 
tackle high unemployment, and growing inflation, because “the very future of the regime rests on 
it.” 225 These goals will remain difficult to achieve as long as the current economic sanctions 
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Economics of North Korea 
 
North Korea’s economy is often described as the last “Stalinist” 226 economy in existence. 
The tale of North Korea’s economy is twofold. On one hand you have the official economy of 
North Korea and on the other you have the “illegal and semi-legal second economy.” 227 The 
official economy of North Korea is driven by the ideological concept of Juche. Juche roughly 
translates into “self-reliance,” 228 and has “guided North Korean ideology.” 229 In economic terms, 
Juche is applied in the following ways. First, “all production [is] owned solely by the state and 
cooperative organizations.” 230 The second principle deals with how the states “formulates unified 
and detailed plans to guarantee a high rate of production growth and balance development of the 
national economy.” 231 Lastly, the third economic principle of juche is “self-sufficiency, socialist 
production relations are based upon the foundation of an independent national economy.” 232  In 
other words, North Korea is a command style economy that does not rely on free markets or the 
global economy to function.  
 
How effective has Juche been as a guiding economic principle? The answer is not very. 
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estimated GDP of $40 billion. 233 Compared to the $2.1 trillion of South Korea there are flaws 
within the North Korean economy. North Korea is one of the “world’s poorest” 234 states with little 
sign of improvement. The economic growth for North Korea has been “weak” 235 over the past 
four years, and it is believed that growth in 2018 was negative. The formal economy of North 
Korea is “centrally planned and grossly mismanaged.” 236 There is virtually no private property in 
North Korea. The extent of the government’s control even extends to “chattel property.” 237 North 
Korea “tolerates” 238 small private markets in the country, these are the semi-legal markets 
mentioned before, but North Korea “lacks even the most basic policy infrastructure of a free-
market economy.” 239  
 
With the lack of a robust private market the role the North Korean government plays in the 
economy is huge. The “government commands and dictates almost every part of the economy and 
directs all significant economic activity.” 240 In the traditional Stalinist approach to economics the 
regime sets “production levels for most products.” 241 The vast majority of North Korea’s GDP is 
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The North Korean regime views business activities “through the lens of maintaining political 
control” 243 and because of this the government holds an “iron grip” 244 over labour groups. There 
are no organized labour groups within North Korea. Monetary policies are tightly controlled by 
the Government. This tight grip leads to “price distortions” 245 which in turn makes life for North 
Korean’s more difficult. The North Korean regime is able to avoid economic collapse due to 
“extensive subsidies” 246 of food and energy from China.  
 
While the Juche principal has not fostered great economic prosperity in North Korea it is 
not without its positives. North Korea produces almost every domestically, albeit not to a 
prosperous extent. This means that North Korea’s “foreign trade amounts only to around 10 
percent of Gross National Product (GNP), far below that of most other countries.” 247 The products 
that North Korea does trade internationally are natural resources like fish, seafood, raw materials 
such as coal. 248 As much as “90%” 249 of North Korea's trade is with China, which has shielded 
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trade in the country's GDP is over 48%.” 250 30.2% 251 of Iran's foreign trade is conducted with 
China. While China is Iran's largest trading partner the reliance on China is nowhere near as 
dramatic as North Korea's trading partnership with China. Trade is not crucial for North Korea's 
mediocre economy to continue operating. While economic sanctions have hurt the economy of 
North Korea it turns out that heavy handed state influence has made the economy somewhat insular 
to foreign disruption.  
 
In a macro sense, North Korea’s economy is very much a command economy, but 
domestically North Koreans have adopted market forces that have produced moderate wealth for 
North Koreans. The Soviet Union's decision to stop economic aid to North Korea proved to be an 
“economic catastrophe.” 252 As a result, North Korea was unable to feed its population resulting in 
a famine that lasted until the 2000s. 253 When the government could not provide for the people the 
people turned to market approaches. North Koreans began to engage in activities such as currency 
exchanges, operating private inns, private libraries, tutoring, and prostitution. 254 Despite the fact 
these private enterprises were “entirely commonplace,” 255 and illegal, the North Korean 
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Even to this day “North Korean leadership tends to take a relaxed and cynical view of the current 
situation. The leaders understand perfectly well that without an active market component, the 
country’s economy would not be able to function even at its current, rather modest, level.” 257 As 
North Korea’s private market continues to grow there are signs that North Korea is beginning to 
“experience income inequality.” 258 A class of nouveau riche have appeared in Pyongyang and 
with them “expensive restaurants and entertainment centers.” 259  
 
The private market in North Korea continues to grow and allows the people to provide for 
themselves what the government cannot, but it is still important to note that “DPRK remains a very 
poor country.” 260 The economy continues to see an estimated growth of around “1.5 percent and 
5 percent,” 261 but “a large number North Koreans (perhaps even the majority) are undernourished 
every spring.” 262 Products such as “meat, fish, and even plain rice remain rare delicacies for most 
North Koreans, and the majority of citizens eat cooked corn rather than rice on a daily basis.” 263  
 
The North Korean economy is an interesting case study for economic sanctions. North 
Korea, despite economic hardship (either inherent to their command style economy or through 
U.S. economic sanctions), has managed to develop and expand on their nuclear program. It would 
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be gained if U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea were to be lifted. With a growing 
number of middle-class North Koreans the promise of economic prosperity could become political 
potent in denuclearizing North Korea. However, due to the heavy handed authoritarianism of North 
Korea, which will be explored in greater detail later in this project, this seems unlikely. In Iran, 
“no matter how inadequate” 264 there are semi-democratic elections and greater personal freedoms 
for people to express their discontent with the government. Iran “welcomes foreign investment 
and its citizens travel abroad relatively freely.” 265 On the other hand, North Korea's “total external 
trade is puny at USD 6 billion as of 2012 (IIT 2013), travel is restricted, and it is one of the poorest 
countries in the world.” 266 The Middle-class in North Korea is still poor compared to their Iranian 
counterparts. North Koreans also live in one of the most brutal contemporary regimes where 
executions of citizens for innocuous reasons is fairly common. For these reasons it is unlikely the 
Middle-class in North Korea would be a potent component in denuclearization. 
 
Security Vulnerabilities of Iran 
 
The security issues that face Iran are less pronounced than that of North Korea. Iran holds 
a strong position relative to its neighbours. States like Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Israel, 
pose as challengers to Iran. However, the material capabilities of Israel and Saudi Arabia are closer 
to parity with Iran's capabilities. Unlike North Korea, a state surrounded by global powers, Iran’s 
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“serious military challenges to the United States and Arab Gulf states.” 267 Despite not being in 
direct conflict with the United States, Iran still believes that the US is Iran’s “main adversary.” 268 
Decades of hostility between the two countries has shaped Iran’s defence policies. Among the 
leadership in Iran there is a consensus that the “Iranian military would likely fare poorly in a 
conventional conflict with the United States.” 269 Considering that the United States is the world's 
largest military and that Iran is more of a mid-power the conclusion is foregone. Due to this reality, 
Iran has “developed asymmetric-warfare concepts” 270 that turn the United States’ strengths into 
disadvantages when engaging with Iran. An example of this in practice is Iran’s use of “swarming 
smallboat attacks in the Strait of Hormuz” 271 against larger US ships. 
 
The tenet of Iran’s defensive capabilities relies on “two key deterrents: its missile program 
and its nonstate partners in the region.” 272 Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities are believed to be in 
the thousands, which makes Iran the owner of “the largest missile force in the Middle East, and 
this force is growing in size and sophistication.” 273 Originally the missile program was developed 
in order to “retaliate proportionately” if Sadam Hussein’s Iraq were to attack. Since the fall of the 
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and “as necessary, to defend fellow Muslims.” 274  Iran’s missile program has reached a level of 
sophistication that Iran is “capable of attacks against infrastructure, military targets, and 
populations.” 275 The range of these missiles has grown over the decades and are capable of 
attacking “targets in Israel, throughout the region, and beyond with its longest-range ballistic 
missiles.” 276  
 
Iran’s heavy reliance on missiles for defence has caused neighbouring countries to react. 
The United States and Israel have “[researched and developed] missile defenses.” 277 The United 
States has also aided allied states in the region by either “purchasing new missile defenses,” 278 
and encouraged rivals of Iran to increase their “long-range strike capabilities.” 279 Saudi Arabia, 
Iran’s main competitor for influence in the region, “acquired long-range conventionally armed 
ballistic missiles” 280 to counter Iran. The United States has also extended protection to states in 
the region. For one, the United States has “increased the strike capabilities” 281 of their air force 
and “has carried out exercises that demonstrate it could make extensive use of conventionally 
armed cruise missiles.” 282 Lastly, the United States has offered allies in the region “U.S. attacks 
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and have been making strides. In the meantime, Iran’s missile program could still achieve a 
staggering amount of destruction on aggressors and US bases in the region. Despite challenges 
from neighbouring countries, Iran’s missile program is still a potent deterrent. 
 
The other tenet of Iran’s defence policy is the use of proxy forces in neighbouring states. 
Iran's leveraging of nonstate actors has allowed Iran to “develop and maintain presence and 
influence in key countries throughout the region without expending Iranian lives and while 
minimizing the costs of its policies.” 284 These forces have the ability to be destabilizing and cost 
very little when compared to traditional military. The reach of Iran through nonstate actors spreads 
throughout the region. It is believed that Iran has backed “Shia forces and militants in Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon.” 285 Iran has been a key supporter of “Hezbollah in Lebanon since 2011.” 286 The Syrian 
Civil War is a case where Iran has used both traditional and nonstate actors. Iran has become a key 
player in the conflict and a “major supporter of the Assad Regime.” 287 In the conflict, Iran has 
“deployed both [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] and regular forces, and Al Quds advisors.” 
288 Due to innovative defence policies and a robust strategy Iran has been able to become a regional 
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While Iran has optimized nontraditional capabilities like missiles and nonstate actors Iran’s 
traditional capabilities have fallen to the wayside. In 2004 Iran’s military capabilities “of combat 
aircraft, tanks and armored personnel carriers, and small boats [were] all technologically obsolete 
in comparison to other regional states.” 289 Despite when the report was written there is “scant 
evidence to suggest this has fundamentally improved in recent years.” 290 The focus of 
asymmetrical warfare has made mounting an invasion against Iran to be a perilous option, but on 
the other hand it has made Iran’s offensive capabilities less than desirable. Iran’s military 
capabilities are “more than matched by the growing strength of Arab Gulf air-sea forces.” 291 On 
top of this Iran has to consider “U.S., British, and French power projection capabilities, growing 
missile defenses, and potential U.S. offers of extended deterrence.” 292 If Iran is not able to 
modernize conventional military aspects then Iran will “remain a weak joint war-fighting force.” 
293  
Iran’s security situation is less fragile than North Korea’s. Iran might lack conventional 
material capabilities to engage in traditional conflicts, but has developed new strategies that 
acutely target the United States material advantages. Iran has been able to develop deterrence 
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Iranian weapons production facilities.” 294 Through the use of nonstate actors Iran has been able 
to expand its influence into some of the regions less stable neighbours such as Iraq, Syria, and 
Yemen. Through a unique strategy Iran has managed to become a regional power of sorts. Many 
policy makers in the United States would be hesitant to repeat the same mistake with Iran as they 
did with Iraq. Considering Iran is twice the size and double the population of Iraq, any decision to 
invade Iran would have to consider the 10+ year quagmire that is Iraq. Due to these factors, Iran 
has developed a deterrence that requires serious consideration from any state before engaging in 
conflict with Iran. Without nuclear weapons Iran is in a relatively safe position from foreign 
invasions and can even spread its influence throughout the region.  
 
The recent assassinations of high-ranking Iranian officials, including that of Qassem 
Soleimani, a major general in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, in January 2020 and of 
Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, a senior official in Iran’s nuclear program, in November 2020 have caused 
concerns within Iran about the government’s ability to protect individuals close to the regime. In 
addition, these assassinations have thrown the prospects of Iran and the United States (as well as 
the remaining P5 +1 members) reimplementing the JCPOA (or similar framework) into question. 
While there is division in the Iranian government, such as the Iranian parliament passing legislation 
“requiring the country to set up its uranium enrichment activities and potentially end the UN 
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JCPOA and that the deal “needs no negotiations.” 296 In return for rejoining the deal Iran wishes 
that the United States permanently stays in the deal. However, how the United States government 
will respond remains uncertain.  
 
Despite escalating tensions and brazen attacks on high-ranking officials in Iran the Iranian 
regime is willing to work with the Biden administration in order to achieve a deal. While the 
rhetoric from Iran is inconsistent, it is believed that the Hard-liners in Iran are taking an adversarial 
approach to the United States over their nuclear program in an attempt to bolster their negotiating 
stance. Iran is not able to protect high ranking officials from attacks from Israel and the United 
States and aggressively pursuing a nuclear program might exacerbate their security vulnerabilities. 
Despite the tensions the Rhouhani administration is willing to work with the Biden administration 
and states like Saudi Arabia over a variety of issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, in order to 
ease regional tensions. Therefore, Iran appears to think that cooperation and diplomacy are more 
likely to ensure the safety of its officials as a more pragmatic approach with regards to their nuclear 
program than acceleration. Therefore, the best chance in ensuring the safety of Iranian officials is 
to come to an agreement with the United States and its regional allies over Iran’s nuclear deal. Not 
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Security Vulnerabilities of North Korea 
 
Due to the eccentric nature of the North Korean regime, their pursuit of nuclear weapons 
is often perceived by the media and politicians as irrational. However, North Korea’s pursuit of 
nuclear weapons is completely rational within a security context. North Korea, as with all states, 
is concerned about the survival of the regime. While the regime holds an iron fist towards its 
population the same cannot be said for the international community. North Korea is surrounded 
by some of the most powerful militaries in the world. That is not even considering the numerous 
US military bases in the region. Due to this reality, North Korea “has one of the largest militaries 
in North-East Asia. The North Korean army has over 1 million personnel” 297 and holds tactical 
leverage over South Korea. This leverage consists of “around 70 percent of its ground forces are 
deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line within 100 miles of the DMZ. It is also common 
knowledge that, by virtue of its geographic location, Seoul and its surrounding suburban areas are 
extremely vulnerable to the thousands of North Korean artillery pieces located along the DMZ.” 
298  
These attributes sound impressive, but in a broader context North Korea’s military 
capabilities pale in comparison to its neighbours. South Korea has many advantages over North 
Korea and is considered a formidable foe with regards to military capabilities, and this is not 
counting for the aid the United States provides. There are two factors that hinder North Korea’s 
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Seoul, right up against North Korean forces across the DMZ.” 299 Secondly, “due to its 
predominantly fixed positioning, the much-discussed North Korean artillery is not a mobile, 
offensive asset useful for invasion and cannot make up for North Korea's increasingly obsolete 
military hardware.” 300 While it is true that North Korea does have a large military it should be 
noted that the bulk of North Korea’s military technology is grossly outdated and inferior to South 
Korea’s military hardware. According to research, “the DPRK’s military hardware is largely 
composed of obsolete relics. Most of its battle tanks were introduced in the 1950s; with few 
exceptions its surface ships are less than 100 tons and technologically outdated; and two-thirds of 
its fighter planes are, much like its obsolete tanks, ancient remnants from half a century ago.” 301  
 
Another concern for North Korea is the deployment of the United States missile defence 
system known as THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence). If North Korea were able to 
launch an attack on South Korea with their traditional missiles THAAD would provide enough 
protection and would allow for South Korean and American forces enough “time to launch [their] 
counterattack” 302 and launch “a devastating series of strikes on North Korean positions.” 303 
THAAD is in essence a defensive measure implemented by the United States in South Korea, but 
there is no doubt about the offensive capabilities of THAAD. THAAD is not the only reassurance 
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Korea the United States has “taken measures to support its ally’s security, including rotational 
deployment of strategic assets (bombers, aircraft carriers, submarines), upgraded military exercises 
and planning, defense equipment procurement, and closely coordinated diplomacy.” 304  
 
This reality is concerning for North Korea, because technically North and South Korea are 
still at war with one another. The prospects of the Korean War restarting are somewhat rare, but 
South Korea’s military capabilities would give pause to North Korea. This of course is just South 
Korea's capabilities, “adding the US into the picture not only skews the already asymmetric 
military balance in the Korean peninsula against the DPRK but also reveals another deep-running 
source of Pyongyang’s insecurity: the decades-long hostility of the US towards North Korea and 
the possibility that it may bring its hegemonic power to bear upon the DPRK.” 305 On the surface, 
without accounting for North Korea’s nuclear weapons, the odds are stacked against North Korea. 
With the current state of the North Korea military there is no possibility of North Korea catching 
up with the military might of South Korea. However, when equating to the fact that North Korea 
has a nuclear arsenal, albeit a small one, the supremacy of South Korea and the United States’ 
military are diminished. In the case of North Korea “not only are nuclear weapons the most 
reassuring means to ensure North Korea’s survival, they are also the cheapest, which makes them 
even more appealing for a country as broke as the DPRK.” 306 One of the important features of 





304 Ibid  
305 Cho, Youngwon. “Method to the Madness of Chairman Kim: The Instrumental Rationality of North Korea’s 
Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons.” International Journal: Canadas Journal of Global Policy Analysis 69, no. 1 (July 
2014): 5–25. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013518489. 17 
306 Ibid, 21 




deterrence is invaluable for a regime like North Korea, because it ensures North Korea a certain 
level of protection from external threats. 
 
The possession of nuclear weapons has made an invasion from the United States and South 
Korea almost impossible. While a victory for the United States would be likely, but “the enormous 
cost it would entail in terms of South Korean civilian casualties” 307 would make any incursion far 
too costly. This deterrence is most beneficial for a regime as unstable and paranoid as North Korea. 
Despite repeated reassurance from the U.S. Department of State that the “U.S. goal is 
denuclearization, not regime change.”308 This has done little to calm down the regime in North 
Korea. Fears of invasion and even nuclear attack from the United States have been “acutely 
heightened by the end of the Cold war.” 309 Since the end of the Cold War, and more importantly 
the abandonment of “Pyongyang by the Soviet Union and Chinese allies,” 310 North Korea has 
witnessed two regimes give up their nuclear weapons program, Iraq and Libya, and both of those 
regimes were toppled by the United States. 
 
In particular, the example of Libya is especially poignant. The Gaddafi regime, “long 
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311 dismantled their nuclear program in favour of economic aid. In return for giving up their nuclear 
program Libya was rewarded with “its removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, lifting 
of sanctions” 312 which are similar incentives promised to North Korea. There was, and arguably 
the most important, an assumption between Libya and the United States that “outright hostilities 
would cease and the US would not seek regime change.” 313 This remains a key reason why North 
Korea rejects denuclearization, because North Korea “believes the United States will not attack a 
country with nuclear weapons.” 314 For North Korea, the security issues it faces without nuclear 
weapons is insurmountable. With aging military hardware, surrounded by the worlds’ largest 
militaries, and with the United States breathing down its neck North Korea simply could not 
compete with its rivals. Even with nuclear weapons North Korea’s material capabilities pale in 
comparison to China, Russia, the United States and to some degree South Korea. Due to these 
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Chapter 7: International Cooperation 
 
While the United States holds a considerable amount of economic clout that does not ignore 
the fact that economic sanctions are an international effort. As discussed before, the United States 
has a plethora of methods of employing economic sanctions from unilaterally (usually threatening 
economic damage to countries who continue trading with the target country) and through the 
United Nations. As one might assume the foreign policy goals are not always aligned with those 
of other countries, even if it has to deal with something as serious as nuclear proliferation. How 
effective sanction regimes are is dependent on international cooperation. If a few key countries 
haphazardly implement or downright ignore economic sanctions then the effects of said economic 
sanctions can be diminished. As we will soon explore whether there is a correlation between the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions and the level of cooperation target countries have with other 
countries. One country in particular, China, and its participation can dramatically affect the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions. 
 
International Cooperation for North Korea 
 
Let us examine North Korea and its relationship with other countries. Often dubbed as the 
Hermit Kingdom, North Korea is a pariah in the international community. Due to their antagonist 
and confrontational approach North Korea is one of the world’s most isolated countries. Even 
China, a traditional ally of North Korea, has grown frustrated 315  with the regime due to their 
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years and China has become more vocal about their annoyance with the Kim regime. The Global 
Times, a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), published an editorial “that made 
it clear that China was ‘‘entitled’’ to reduce its aid to North Korea ‘‘without hesitation and 
simultaneously’’ if another test took place.” 316 There have been tangible results from the growing 
separation between China and North Korea. In 2015 China “rejected North Korean entry into the 
China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank—a severe blow to North Korea’s economic 
future.” 317 Actions like this from China have made North Korea more isolated and more 
economically fragile. 
 
Since Donald Trump took office in the United States his administration has sought to 
capitalize on China’s frustration and has “used high-level diplomacy to engage Beijing on North 
Korean policy.” 318 As China makes up at least “85 per-cent of North Korea’s external trade” 319 
it would be difficult for economic sanctions to be effective without the help of the Chinese. In 
fact, some experts believe that China “holds the key to resolving the North Korea nuclear issue.” 
320 While it is true that economic sanctions have mixed results on the North Korean economy 
(due to reasons previously discussed), China's “pressure on North Korea through sanctions … 
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with the imposition of sanctions being followed by North Korea returning to the negotiating 
table.” 321  
 
There is a long list of examples to point to of China using their economic leverage over 
North Korea to sway not only their nuclear program, but other provocative actions. After North 
Korea successfully detonated their first nuclear bomb China supported the “UN Security Council 
Resolution 1718 and conducted intensive mediation between North Korea and the US, which led 
at the end of the year to the return of North Korea to the Six Party talks— since 2003 the main 
China-sponsored forum for negotiating the North Korea nuclear issue.” 322 As North Korea 
continued to test nuclear weapons China would continue to approve UN Security Council 
resolutions and take unilateral action banning exports of oil, coal, and access to Chinese financial 
services. 323  
 
While China and the United States are aiming to the same end, a denuclearized North 
Korea, it does not mean that China does not have their own goals. In addition to the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, China also wants to prevent “North Korea from falling 
under US influence [and prevent] military conflicts and humanitarian crises on the Korean 
Peninsula, which might affect the stability of China’s northeast region.” 324 China is North Korea’s 













consequences would be severe. The chances of the North Korean regime collapsing would almost 
be inevitable considering the regime is not exactly stable with current levels of trade and aid with 
China. If the regime were to collapse at best there would be a refugee crisis and at worst nuclear 
weapons falling into the wrong hands. 
 
An example of China easing on North Korea due to concerns of instability occurred after 
North Korea’s sixth nuclear test. At first China imposed “limitations on the supply of oil in October 
of that year in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2375.” 325 However, shortly after the 
implementation China soon eased the ban on oil exports, because of the increase of oil prices 
within North Korea. Which “combined with restrictions on coal, textiles, agricultural and other 
imports from North Korea, the latter’s many economic activities came to a halt, and its foreign 
currency reserves dropped sharply.” 326 Fears that too intense economic pressures on North Korea 
could lead to the regime to collapse has caused China to ease up the economic pressure. If North 
Korea were to collapse that would cause greater problems for China than the status quo. China’s 
approach has caused economic sanctions to be less effective than they could be due to the level of 
dependency North Korea has on China. 
 
Of course, China is not entirely altruistic in their goals to denuclearize North Korea. China 
is trying to use their leverage over North Korea to “negotiate trade with the US and to enhance 
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over Pyongyang and its seat in the North Korea nuclear talks. This also serves as a bargaining chip 
in China’s trade war with the US.” 328 While denuclearizing North Korea is important to the 
Chinese it appears that China and their use of economic sanctions are a “diplomatic card for Beijing 
in shaping North Korea’s behavior, as well as to negotiate with the US on nuclear, trade and other 
issues.” 329 Donald Trump’s openness to North Korea arguably is an attempt to remove China from 
the picture so the United States can deal directly with the Kim regime and negotiate 
denuclearization without China’s influence. China is unlikely to stand by as the United States 
brings North Korea closer to their sphere of influence, especially considering how useful North 
Korea can be to China’s goals. 
 
The United States and China are not the only two actors trying to get North Korea to 
denuclearize, nor the only countries looking to utilize North Korea for their benefit. From an 
unpublished UN report, “North Korea has increasingly turned to Russia as a partner in its oil and 
coal trade,” 330 which violates UN sanctions. South Korea, who has the most to gain from a 
denuclearized North Korea in both economic and security issues, has called for “easing of 
sanctions against North Korea.” 331 Similar to China, if the North Korean regime were to collapse 
South Korea would have to deal with the consequences. Japan has economic incentives for the 
lowering of sanctions. Due to North Korea's abundance of minerals and a cheap labour force 













normalized.” 332 While tensions remain high on the Korean peninsula over North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons program there is the potential for North Korea’s neighbours to benefit. Russia, South 
Korea, Japan, and even the United States “all have the potential to become Pyongyang’s new 
benefactors in place of Beijing.” 333  
 
As a result, other countries, such as China, Russia, and even South Korea take a different 
approach to economic sanctions over North Korea. An illuminating case study of this is UN 
Resolution 1718. UN Resolution 1718 was to impose “an embargo on exports of heavy weapons. 
Dual-use items, and luxury goods to North Korea, as well as on importation of heavy water systems 
from North Korea.” 334 Every country that agreed to imposing these smart sanctions on North 
Korea agreed to limit the export of luxury goods to North Korea, but “no evidence has been found 
that UN economic sanctions have had any effect on North Korea’s trade in luxury goods with its 
largest trade partner, China. Nor is there evidence that sanctions have had an indirect effect on 
North Korea’s aggregate trade with its two principal partners, China and South Korea.” 335 The 
problem with this particular round of sanctions against North Korea was that “sanctions left to 
individual UN members.“ 336 Meaning that the individual country could decide what was 















sanctions. The end result allowed the North Korean elite to continue receiving luxury items and 
therefore negating the effectiveness of the economic sanctions. 
 
The economic sanctions on luxury goods is an example that highlights how states’ 
individual self-interest and a lack of enforcement can render sanctions useless. This reality shows 
that for other states, preventing North Korea from having nuclear weapons, while important, is not 
as high a priority as it might be for the United States. Therefore, how states implement economic 
sanctions will be dependent on that state’s self-interest. Countries such as China and South Korea 
have interest in keeping the North Korean regime stable enough to avoid a collapse. In order to 
avoid a collapse, China and South Korea continue to trade with North Korea (albeit not to the same 
extent). Both understand the importance of restricting North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and do 
implement sanctions, but not to the same degree as the United States. This uneven application 
allows the North Korean regime some breathing room. Although a valid strategy on paper, the 
implementation of economic sanctions can often have mixed results. 
 
International Cooperation for Iran 
 
Iran’s position in the international community is vastly different from North Korea’s. As 
mentioned earlier, Iran’s economy is more connected to the global economy, despite economic 
sanctions imposed by the United States and the international community. Iran’s also wealthier 
than North Korea, although that is not a high bar to clear. Iran’s material capabilities are much 
greater than that of North Korea’s. While Iran does not possess nuclear weapons, at least not yet, 
it yields an impressive armed force and an extensive network of proxy forces and militias. Iran 




finds itself in competition with Saudi Arabia for “influence and dominance” 337 in the Middle 
East. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the subsequent overthrowing of Saddam Hussein there 
was a “power vacuum” 338 in the Middle East in which Iran partially filled. After the fall of 
Saddam tensions between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shais grew. As these tensions began to boil over 
“Iran supported Iraqi Shia; Saudi Arabia supported Iraqi Sunnis.” 339 The tensions between Iran 
and Saudi Arabia would continue to grow as the Arab Spring swept the region and “as some 
regimes were toppled and others desperately clung to power.” 340 Iran has been accused of 
“waging proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, and even inside [Saudi Arabia].” 341 
Iran’s actions have brought upon ire and criticism from regional states and from the United 
States and allies. This has left Iran in an isolated position. 
 
The United States has been able to use their leverage and mutual concerns about Iran to 
persuade regional players into isolating Iran politically and economically. Despite the economic 
incentive Middle Eastern countries would gain from working with Iran they have opted not to 
because “no government in the region wished to find itself facing an Iran in possession of nuclear 
weapons.” 342 Iran without nuclear weapons is a regional power. With nuclear weapons the balance 
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more powerful Iran. Other states knew the strategy of the United States under President Bush and 
Obama was to “attempt to resolve the situation diplomatically.” 343  
 
Outside of the region, the United States also has considerable help from the European 
Union and United Kingdom. As mentioned before in the economic section, the EU has taken the 
initiative to impose sanctions on Iran based on insurance and oil exports over Iran’s nuclear 
program. The European Union (which at the time included the United Kingdom) has taken an 
assertive role in dealing with Iran and their nuclear program. The EU, and the United States, hold 
considerable economic leverage over Iran. If the EU and the United States wished they could cut 
“all communication with the country – flights, telephone, internet, banking – along with the 
countries that would follow their leadership, Iran would be compelled to yield.” 344 This would 
grind Iran’s economy to a halt and subsequently Iran’s nuclear program. Even friends of 
convenience like China and Russia “would not be enthusiastic about standing against the West’s 
actions to defend Iran.” 345  
 
Europe, mostly France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have adopted a more 
pragmatic and less disruptive approach to solving the issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. 
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union all played an important role in the 
formulation of the JCPOA. The European Union and United Kingdom were invested heavily in 












Iran and the EU. In fact, when the United States walked away from the JCPOA the EU tried to 
salvage the deal. Due to US sanctions, commercial banks would not be able to “transfer funds to 
Iran’s Central Bank and many other designated financial institutions.” 346 Europe looked into 
alternative “electronic money transfer systems” 347 that could not be blocked by the United States. 
One idea that came up was for Europe to use European central banks to transfer money to Iran, 
because the assumption was that the United States would “never sanction a European central 
bank.” 348 Under this system, “a central bank would collect hundreds or even thousands of planned 
transactions and ‘bundle’ them together, sending the funds to Iran in one lump sum that would 
then be redistributed to the intended recipients in Iran.” 349 
 
Ultimately these schemes and Europe’s efforts to keep Iran in the JCPOA would be 
unsuccessful. In January 2020 Iran would officially leave the JCPOA. The point is not that the EU 
and the UK were successful in keeping Iran in the nuclear deal, but rather their efforts and 
involvement into solving the issue of Iran’s nuclear program is far more involved than other 
members in North Korea’s case. It was a high priority of the EU and UK to not only keep Iran 
nuclear free, but to be able to access Iran’s natural resources. Ironically, it was “the European 
Union that faces the “biggest brunt of these reimposed sanctions” 350 as the Trump administration 
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like China and India.” 351 Unlike the North Korea case, the European Union played arguably a 
larger role than the United States in bringing Iran to an agreement over its nuclear program and 
trying to maintain said deal. 
 
Traditionally, Iran has had to look towards the West for economic investment, but “has 
grown frustrated with European countries that have opposed Mr. Trump’s policy but quietly 
withdrawn from the kinds of deals that the nuclear agreement once promised.” 352 China’s rising 
role on the world stage and in the Middle East has presented Iran with an alternative to Western 
exports and investment. As of July 2020, there is an agreement between China and Iran which 
could amount to “billions of dollars of Chinese investments in energy and other sectors.” 353 This 
deal between the two countries would allow for Chinese presence in “banking, 
telecommunications, ports, railways and dozens of other projects.” 354 In return, Iran would provide 
China with oil at a “heavily discounted” 355 price. This deal also includes a “deepening of military 
cooperation” 356 which includes “joint training and exercises, joint research and weapons 
development and intelligence sharing.” 357 This new deal would give Iran not only much needed 
economic investment, but a strategic partner and China a foot in the door in the Middle East. Most 






352 Fassihi, F., & Myers, S. (2020, July 11). Defying U.S., China and Iran Near Trade and Military Partnership. 












Maximum Pressure campaign against Iran. While the details of the deal between Iran and China 
are still in the air this does highlight how sanction efforts by the United States have been successful 
in isolating Iran economically, if not too well. An increasingly isolated and desperate Iran caught 
the eyes of an opportunistic China, one of the members of the P5+1 in signing the Iran Nuclear 
Deal. While Iran’s nuclear ambitions have concerned China, their self-interest and gaining 
influence in the region has taken priority over the trying to hinder Iran. 
 
The alleged deal between Iran and China has been “quietly drafted” 359 due to potential 
pushback from both sides of Iran’s political spectrum. The agreement has been criticized for 
“selling off” 360 and economically and politically weakened Iran to China. China’s Belt and Road 
initiative leaving African and Asian countries “indebted and ultimately beholden to the authorities 
in Beijing” 361 have stoked fears that Iran could share the very same fate as those countries. Much 
like Iran’s economic ties with China there are concerns of becoming overly dependent on China. 
However, with the economic and political situation in Iran getting worse and a lack of coherence 
from the United States and allies Iran is left with few options. 
 
To summarize, Iran is a fairly isolated state due to its aggressive foreign policy and 
antagonism of regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Israel. The United States, and equal parts the 
European Union, have been able to capitalize on Iran’s isolation to enact an effective economic 












States, and regional players all want the same thing: a nuclear free Iran. Unlike North Korea, where 
a great deal of their material capabilities are associated with their nuclear arsenal, Iran is a regional 
power without nuclear weapons. Iran getting nuclear weapons could drastically alter the balance 
of power in the Middle East and cause a nuclear arms race; a situation states would like to avoid. 
The joint effort between the European Union and the United States have made the conditions for 
Iran signing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action more likely. However, this economic leverage 
over Iran is diminishing as China takes a more aggressive role in the world stage. In Iran there are 
concerns of becoming overly dependent on China. Such a heavy reliance on China might push 
investors from other countries, like South Korea, away as from Iran over fears of competition 
viability. Despite this, with an aggressive United States and a politically immobile European Union 
Iran is left with little options. The role of China, in the future, could pose a threat to Western 
economic leverage and to an extent the potency of the economic sanction regime that has been 




Bringing this back to our Most Similar System Design we can see that both Iran and 
North Korea are under intense economic pressures over their nuclear programs. These economic 
sanctions have created an unfavorable economic condition in both countries. However, there is a 
key difference in the implementation of these economic sanctions. In North Korea’s case the 
actors involved, with the possible exception of the United States, seek to exploit North Korea’s 
dire economic condition to receive benefits. In exchange for a lax implementation of certain 
economic sanctions China gains political leverage over the United States in matters such as 




trade. States like Russia and Japan gain economic benefits (such as cheap labour). In Iran’s case 
there is a genuine attempt to solve Iran’s nuclear dilemma, especially from the European Union 
and the United Kingdom. The states involved would like to limit an already capable Iran whilst 
gaining access to Iran’s economy. While there is a difference in how these economic sanctions 
are employed one constant remains intact: states are acting in their self-interest while attempting 




































Chapter 8: Political Contestation 
 
Iran's Regime  
 
The regime of Iran is arguably one of the most unique political structures in modern 
political science. Iran is an authoritarian state, earning a 17 out of 100 on Freedom House’s 
scale. 362 For context, China scores a 10 out of 100 and the United States scores an 86 out of 100. 
363 Despite the relatively low score, especially compared to the United States, Iran is sprinkled 
with democratic elements. Iran, unlike other authoritarian regimes, “holds elections regularly” 364 
for positions in the national legislature (The Islamic Consultative Assembly or also known 
simply as the Majles) and even the presidency. These elections are not nearly as democratic as 
elections held in the United States and other Western democracies. The reason for this is the 
Guardian Council, “an unelected body that disqualifies all candidates it deems insufficiently 
loyal to the clerical establishment.” 365 Iranian politicians must fit within a fairly narrow political 
spectrum, which includes not questioning the status quo too critically, to even be allowed to run 
in an election. At the top of the Iranian government lies the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei and the institutions he directly controls. Examples of said institutions are the security 
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The supreme leader of Iran, a position that has “no fixed term,” 366 is the highest authority 
in Iran. In addition to controlling the Judiciary and the Military the supreme leader also controls 
“state broadcast media, and the Expediency Council—a body tasked with mediating disputes 
between the Guardian Council and the parliament.” 367 The position of the supreme leader is 
appointed by the Assembly of Experts. The assembly is supposed to act as a check on the power 
of the supreme leader and “monitor his works,” 368 but is reality the decisions of the supreme leader 
“go unchallenged by the assembly.” 369 The head of the Iranian government is essentially an 
unelected and unquestioned leader that has no term limits. This is inherently undemocratic. The 
position of the supreme leader seriously damages the legitimacy of Iran’s more democratic aspects. 
 
The supreme leader of Iran is the unquestioned leader of Iran, but “the second-highest-
ranking official” 370 is the semi-democratically elected president. The president of Iran is elected 
by “popular vote for up to two consecutive four-year terms.” 371 The president is allowed to appoint 
a cabinet, but this cabinet must be confirmed by parliament. Term limits and the confirmation of 
cabinet members, which are common practices in other democracies, create a veneer of democracy 
within Iran. The truth is who can run for president is a very small and selective group of people. 
For example, in 2017 of the 1,600 candidates that applied to run for president “only six men were 
















the Guardian Council.”373 The process, while not entirely democratic, still allows the Iranian 
people to have a choice in their governments, albeit within a predetermined group of candidates. 
Rouhani won his reelection bid with 57 percent in an election with 70 percent turnout. His victory 
“appeared to reflect the choice of the electorate among the available candidates.” 374  
 
The vetting process of Iranian politicians is not just limited to presidential candidates. As 
one might assume the same criteria applies to hopeful candidates to Iran’s legislative body. 
Iranians are allowed to directly vote for members of the Iranian parliament (290-member body 
with 4-year terms) and the Assembly of Experts (86 member body with 8-year terms), but who 
can run for these positions must be “approved by the Guardian Council.” 375 In the 2016 elections 
of all the candidates who applied to run in the parliamentary elections only 51 percent of the 
candidates were approved making it the “lowest figure to date.” 376 The selection for the Assembly 
of Experts was even more undemocratic as only 20 percent of candidates were approved, “also a 
record low.” 377 Moderates and reformists can be successful in Iran’s political system, the current 
president Rouhani is an example of moderate success, “the unelected components of the 
constitutional system represent a permanent barrier to opposition electoral victories and genuine 
rotations of power.” 378 The Iranian regime is interesting to examine due to its juxtapositions. Iran 
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at the top are free from criticism and selected by a very small group of the population. The 
president, the second highest position in the country, is democratically elected but who can even 
be considered for president is selected by the supreme leaders and the guardian council. The same 
goes for positions in the Iranian parliament. Iran by western standards is far from democratic. 
However, relative to other regimes Iran allows for a fair amount of political participation from the 
public. This is important to note, because this modest amount of political participation allows for 
economic sanctions to produce a galvanizing effect. As economic turmoil continues Iranians can 
vote for different political leaders, protest in the streets, and have a limited effect on government 
policy. As mentioned before, a key element of Rouhani coming to power was Iranian discontent.  
 
North Korea’s Regime 
 
North Korea is ranked one of the least free countries on the planet. While Iran’s score of 
17/100 is low compared to Western democracies, North Korea scores an astonishingly low 3/100. 
379 North Korea is a “one-party state led by a dynastic totalitarian dictatorship.” 380 Much of the 
country’s power is consolidated within the chairman of the State Affairs Commission (SAC) Kim 
Jong-un.” 381 Kim Jong-un also holds the highest position in the “National Defense Commission—
previously the highest state body—and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army.” 382 
North Korea’s political system consolidated a considerable amount of power at the top of the 















North Korea does have a unicameral legislature known as the Supreme People’s 
Assembly (SPA). The candidates for the SPA are “preselected” 383 by the dominant Korean 
Workers’ Party (KWP) and smaller “subordinate parties” 384 such as the Democratic Front for the 
Reunification of the Fatherland (DRFR). Once the candidate has been selected, they run in an 
uncontested election. North Koreans not only have no choice in who their candidate is, but they 
have no choice in whether they vote or not. Voting in North Korea is “compulsory” 385 for 
citizens 17 years old and older. Turnout for these elections “commonly approaches 100 percent.” 
386 While these elections are not in the slightest democratic, they serve the purpose as an 
“unofficial census” 387 to see who has voted. Those who choose to exercise their choice and do 
not vote can be charged with “treason.” 388 North Korea, “effectively a one-party state,” 389 not 
only restricts any meaningful elections, but also restricts “political participation” 390 for citizens. 
Even members of the KWP have to be cautious and follow the party line for fears of 
repercussions. Members of the KWP are subject to regular purges. These purges designed to 
demonstrate Kim Jong-un’s “authority” 391 over the legislature. Members who are seen as 
disloyal can face harsh punishments such as being purged and even “executed.” 392 North 



















are strict and arbitrary for individuals seen as subversive. Unlike Iran, with modest political 
participation, there is very little room for public dissent. Therefore, economic sanctions are 
unlikely to create a galvanizing effect among the population. While economic conditions are 
worse than that of Iran’s so are the punishments for criticizing the regime. 
 
 
Analysis of the Two Regimes 
 
Both Iran and North Korea are authoritarian regimes. However, with a deeper analysis 
there are considerable differences between the two states. Most of Iran’s political power lies in 
the hands of the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, but a significant amount of political 
power, most notably the position of president, is chosen by the people of Iran. Unlike many of 
Iran’s neighbors, women can participate within the political process (assuming they are approved 
by the Guardian Council). While flawed, Iranians do have a method of changing governments 
that is somewhat democratic. Iranians also voice their discontent in more noticeable ways. 
Despite the dangers, Iranians are still motivated to protest when the government takes actions 
that harm them. For example, in November 2019 Iranians took to the streets to protest the 
increase in fuel prices and the overall “economic crisis driven by a combination of US-led trade 
sanctions and mismanagement by the regime.” 393 The Iranian regime holds considerable control 
over Iranians, but not absolute. For the Iranian regime to survive it is imperative for the regime 










sanctions more conducive to work. Therefore, economic sanctions are more effective at 
galvanizing Iranians and generate change. 
 
On the other hand, North Korea is arguably the most authoritarian state in the world. Kim 
Jung-Un holds almost absolute power as the legislature and judicial branch are essentially rubber 
stamps. While there are limited avenues for the citizens of Iran to express their discontent, criticism 
of the Kim regime is often a death sentence. The government has an oppressive role in the lives of 
people. Therefore, it is unlikely that people can have a meaningful impact in how the government 
shapes policy. While economic sanctions have harmed the populace of North Korea it is unlikely 
to produce a meaningful movement due to the disproportionate response the government would 
provide. Therefore, it is unlikely that economic sanctions can galvanize the population of North 





















Economic sanctions have been successful in stopping Iran from pursuing their nuclear 
program thus far. Iran has conceded multiple times to the United States and the international 
community to halt the enrichment of uranium and the advancement of their nuclear program. The 
most notable example of Iran’s concessions has been the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan 
of Action in which Iran agreed to halt and greatly reduce their nuclear program in return for 
substantial easing of economic sanctions. The second criteria has been met as Iran’s economy has 
significantly worsened due to continued economic pressure from the United States and the 
international community. Iran’s economy has significantly worsened due to continued economic 
pressure from the United States and the international community. Continued economic pressure 
has been paramount to bringing Iran to the negotiating table. While the United States and its 
regional allies do pose a military threat to Iran, that is unlikely a sufficient factor in dissuading 
Iran.  
 
We have established that the level of political contestation in the targeted countries, their 
economic and security vulnerabilities, and the degree of international cooperation are important 
factors in determining if economic sanctions are effective at limiting nuclear proliferation. In Iran’s 
case the regime, while authoritarian, allows for limited political contestation. The general public 
gets to elect the president (even if candidates are handpicked by the supreme leader). Iranians have 
been able to protest against the government. One goal of economic sanctions is to galvanize the 
general public against the government and their policy decisions. Iranians have indeed been 




frustrated by the sanctions and voiced their discontent with the government policies targeted by 
the sanctions.  
 
Iran’s international environment is also conductive for economic sanctions to be effective. 
Iran is a regional power with an impressive arsenal of missiles and extensive network of proxy 
forces. Therefore, nuclear weapons are not imperative for Iran’s defence. On the other end, Iran’s 
economy is largely based on oil and gas exports. Integration into the global market is very 
important for Iranians and a vital source of revenue for the government. Economic sanctions have 
hurt the Iranian economy and therefore have hurt Iranians. The economic squeeze has brought Iran 
to the negotiating table in the past and will likely do so in the future. The international approach 
to Iran has been encompassing with the European Union and the United Kingdom taking a 
common stand with the United States in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Even 
after the United States left the JCPOA the EU and UK have attempted to develop mechanisms to 
provide Iran with economic incentives to keep Iran abiding to the JCPOA. Even though China has 
given Iran an economic lifeline there is tension within Iran over concerns of becoming too 
economically dependent on China.  
 
Economic sanctions against North Korea have been unsuccessful in stopping its nuclear 
program. There have been modest concessions from North Korea, such as temporarily halting their 
nuclear program, but overall North Korea has expanded their nuclear program despite objections 
from the international community. Since the end of the Cold War North Korea has developed 
ICBM technology. There are cases of using sanctions, or the threat of using implementing them, 
that have changed North Korea’s behaviour (even if only briefly). The most notable example is 




the Banco Delta Asia incident where the threat of sanctions brought North Korea back to the Six-
Party Talks. However, sanctions have not changed the overall attitude of the North Korean regime. 
In fact, one could argue that increased economic sanctions emboldened North Korea to take a 
hardline approach to their nuclear program. Lastly, there are other explanations to explain the 
occasional pause in North Korea’s nuclear program. The most obvious is the role of China. China 
essentially keeps the regime afloat with economic and humanitarian aid. China has become openly 
critical of North Korea’s nuclear program and has made statements about reducing aid as a result. 
While China has been accused of going soft on North Korea there is no doubt China holds a 
considerable amount of leverage over North Korea and could convince them to slow down nuclear 
testing.  
Using the same four variables of our framework, we can see why economic sanctions have 
been ineffective in stopping North Korea’s nuclear program. North Korea is one of, if not, the most 
authoritarian states on the planet. Even modest criticism of the regime or its leadership can result 
in harsh punishment including death. There is almost no political contestation at the level of the 
general public, which prevents the negative consequences of economic sanctions for the population 
from having an effect on the government policy. North Korea is a poor country. However, the 
insular nature of its economic system allows for North Korea to get by and is somewhat immune 
to economic sanctions. North Korea’s largest trading partner is China, and China has shielded 
North Korea from harsher economic sanctions. There is no doubt that North Korea would benefit 
from the easing of economic sanctions, but security vulnerabilities North Korea faces, and the 
solutions nuclear weapons provide, are far too valuable. North Korea is situated between some of 
the largest militaries in the world and faces the heavy presence of the United States military has in 
the region. Nuclear weapons are attractive to the North Korean government as a cheap and viable 




solution to deal with its security problems. They serve as a strong deterrence against any invasion 
by outside powers.  
 
North Korea has a very close relationship with China. Not only is China North Korea’s 
largest trading partner, it also provides North Korea with a great deal of economic aid.  For China, 
a North Korean collapse would cause a refugee crisis and the possibility of nuclear weapons ending 
in the wrong hands. Besides China, South Korea is interested in preventing the collapse of the Kim 
regime for many of the same reasons as China. Japan, Russia, and others have economic interests 
in North Korea which makes a coordinated international effort much more difficult than the efforts 
implemented against Iran.  
Broad Implications 
 
Stepping away from Iran and North Korea, what can we extrapolate about economic 
sanctions? Economic sanctions are a useful policy tool, but hardly enough on its own. Libya’s 
nuclear program highlights the strength and weakness of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions 
imposed on Libya were successful in getting “Libya to renounce aiding terror and, later, its 
weapons of mass destruction programs.” 394 However, in the case of Libya there was a plethora of 
other policy tools, such as “back-channel negotiations, the Protection Security Initiative, and the 
unspoken threat of invasion after Operation Freedom.” 395 Thinking of economic sanctions as a 
tool that can solely fix any political problem would be misguided. There are limitations, as there 
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combination with other policy tools, can be an effective tool to “sustain pressure” 396 on the target 
country to yield diplomatic concessions. Some examples of this include bringing “Cuba and Iran 
to the negotiating table, and [sanctions] contributed to Putin’s willingness to accept (if not fully 
implement) the Minsk II ceasefire agreement in Ukraine.” 397  
 
For economic sanctions to be effective in getting concessions from countries, there needs 
to be a “diplomatic dimension.” 398 Even a state with tremendous economic clout, like the United 
States, needs international help in imposing sanctions. Going back to Iran and the successes there, 
we see decades of close coordination between the United States, the EU, and regional allies aiming 
for the same goal. The same cannot be said with the North Korean case. The United States was 
unable to move a potential adversary, China, into implementing similar sanctions (at least with 
regards to intensity of said sanctions). As China continues to rise and US influence begins to wane 
this will pose a serious challenge to US economic statecraft in the future. In order to combat this 
trend, the United States must reinvigorate existing alliances and develop coherent foreign policy 
goals. In addition, the United States needs to offer positive sanctions instead of implementing 
negative sanctions that are reasonable. The JCPOA is a great example of a give and take 
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Iran’s case, the effects of economic sanctions are palpable. Continued economic pressure has been 
paramount to bringing Iran to the negotiating table. Lastly, there are no alternative explanations 
that can explain Iran’s actions that are as credible as economic sanctions. While the United States 
and its regional allies do pose a military threat to Iran, it is unlikely that that alone would dissuade 
Iran. 
 
We have established that the economic/security vulnerabilities, international cooperation, 
and the limited political contestation are important factors in determining if economic sanctions 
will be effective at limiting nuclear proliferation. In Iran’s case the regime, while authoritarian, 
allows for moderate influence from the general public. The general public gets to elect a new 
president (even if the candidates are handpicked by the supreme leader). This is a direct impact the 
citizens have on the regime. Another factor in Iran is the frequency in which Iranians protest the 
government over economic stagnation. While economic sanctions are one reason for Iran’s 
worsening economic condition the general public still pressures the government to take action on 
the economy. One goal of economic sanctions is to galvanize the general public against the 
government and their policy decisions. While there are obstacles in place to prevent total freedom 
of speech there is enough room for Iranians to voice their discontent with the government and their 
policies. Due to Iranian's relative wealth being squandered by government mismanagement and 
economic sanctions there is a great deal for Iranians to protest about. 
 
Iran’s international standing is also ideal for economic sanctions to be effective. Iran is a 
regional power which confirms two things. Iran has amassed rival powers which has made 
cooperation with the United States in the region more ideal for smaller states who fear a nuclear 




Iran. The other factor is that Iran is powerful enough that a collapse in the regime, and the 
subsequent humanitarian crisis seem like a remote possibility. The international approach to Iran 
has also been more encompassing with the European Union and the United Kingdom taking a 
vested interest in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The most notable example of 
this is the European Union and the United Kingdom taking a pivotal role in the formation and the 
maintenance of the JCPOA. Even after the United States left the JCPOA the EU and UK would 
attempt to develop mechanisms to provide Iran with economic incentives to keep Iran abiding to 
the JCPOA. Even though the rise of China throws the economic clout of the EU, UK, and US over 
Iran into question there is still a great deal the US and allies can do to inflict economic damage to 
Iran. Even though China has given Iran an economic lifeline there is tension within Iran over 
concerns of becoming too economically dependent on China. Already this closeness is causing 
troubles with other countries. South Korea's desire “of turning Iran into a regional hub for export 
of its goods and services into the wider Middle East and Central Asia”399 have been dashed as Iran 
move closer to China. The South Koreans have difficulties in seeing “how a U.S. ally can increase 
the strategic worth of a Chinese ally at a time when “sphere politics” is set for a strong comeback.” 
400  
In North Korea there is almost no political contestation at the level of the general public 
which prevents the negative consequences of economic sanctions from having any effect on the 













it serves as a strong deterrence against outside powers. North Korea has a very close relationship 
with China. Not only is China North Korea’s largest trading partner, it also provides North Korea 
with a great deal of economic aid. Besides China, South Korea is interested in preventing the 
collapse of the Kim regime for many of the same reasons as China. Japan, Russia, and others have 
economic interests in North Korea which makes a coordinated international effort much more 
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